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EAST TIMOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE REPORT

October 1980
New York City



Edited by Michael Chamberlain

A Statement of Position

Recently the Indonesian government has been claiming that conditions are greatly improved in East Timor. In addition, they are taking pride in the "efforts being made to develop their 27th Province." The best way to help the people of East Timor, so the argument goes, is to drop all criticism of the Indonesian government and co-operate with Indonesian development efforts.

To do this would be to fail to recognize the real character of Indonesian relief and development efforts over the past five years. In addition, to mute our criticisms and co-operate with Indonesian development efforts would be to turn our backs on the human and international rights violations that continue to take place. By consciously accepting these Indonesian practices, we ourselves become accomplices to the silence that is smothering East Timor; by not working to end the silence, we become responsible for each new death.

Having a tradition of recognizing that the rights of a people cannot be secured by hostile military intervention, we cannot, in all conscience, accept the continued presence of Indonesia or its military in East Timor. The bloody process by which Indonesia has maintained its presence surely cannot be considered as an expression of the will of the East Timorese people. This has been the basis of our support for the struggle of the East Timorese people for their internationally recognized rights.

While we recognize that Indonesia may now be making attempts to improve conditions in East Timor, this cannot change the facts of the situation. First of all, it is the Indonesian military that brought the East Timorese the vision of hell that they have endured for the past five years, a hell that still continues. Secondly, "development" will never be Indonesia's first priority in East Timor. Securing control of the territory and eliminating resistance will always be Indonesia's chief priority and whenever that is threatened, "development" will stop. As long as the people of East Timor continue to resist, and they most certainly will, death and repression will reign over food and development in Indonesia held East Timor.

Consequently, we who are concerned as to the best way to help the people of East Timor cannot support Indonesia development objectives, as they serve only to strengthen Indonesia's grip on East Timor. Already, Indonesia has made it very clear it plans to maintain control over the East Timorese by continuing to detain those living in resettlement camps, thus making them dependent upon the Indonesian government for survival.

Finally, while we recognize the importance of *international* relief efforts and encourage their expansion to offset the famine that does and continues to exist, we cannot support developmental program such as US AID in East Timor. We know from the experiences of many other countries, and from the reports of East Timorese refugees, that such "development" is commensurate with the domination, control and repression of East Timor by Indonesia. Those who do defend such programs fail to see the connection between the development programs and the repression and violence inflicted on the East Timorese. Such "development" destroys East Timor's cultural, social, economic, and political life, it is a cultural genocide which accompanies the physical genocide. Neither of these are acceptable.

—Michael Chamberlain

CONTENTS

The October Conference 3

The U.S. Campaign 11
Michael Chamberlain

A History of Relief Aid 13
James Dunn

Recent Refugee Reports 7
Jill Jolliffe

U.S. Interests in Timor 22
Adm. Gene LaRocque

Congressional Activity 17
Arnold Kohen

A Cultural Evening 24

The Consequences for Indonesia 26
Benedict Anderson

The People's History 30
Shepard Forman

Government & Media Responses . 33
Noam Chomsky

The International Scene 40
Jose Ramos-Horta

A Chronology of the War 37

Resources 44

Action Suggestions 20

Map 6

This report is dedicated, as is our work, to those Timorese who have died with the hope of freedom; to those Timorese who suffer under a foreign hand; and those Timorese who struggle in mind, body and spirit inside East Timor and beyond its borders, to make their land free for themselves. May they all live in Peace and Freedom, and help us to change.

Cover photo: Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA).

This Report was published by the East Timor Program of Clergy and Laity Concerned, January 1981. This is the official report of the East Timor International Conference held on October 19 and 20, 1980 in New York City. We would like to thank those who attended the conference and those who contributed and worked to make the conference possible. Those who wish to reproduce portions of this report may do so freely, as long as this report is cited as the source. Any comments, inquiries, or suggestions should be addressed to the East Timor Program, Clergy and Laity Concerned, 198 Broadway Room 302, New York, N.Y. 10038 — or call (212) 964-6730.

Some Conference Afterthoughts

The International Conference on East Timor that we organized in New York City is just part of our response to what the United States has not done to stop the suffering of the people of East Timor. East Timor is seemingly not important enough for the United States to use its influence and leverage with Indonesia to halt the invasion or to terminate its occupation of East Timor. And until last year, East Timor was also seemingly not important enough for the mass media here to heed the accounts of atrocities committed by the Indonesian military and reported by East Timorese refugees and other people who know the country. The resulting lack of accurate information and the abundance of misinformation perpetuated by the State Department, Church Boards and other parties with interests in Indonesia still need to be addressed. The International Conference tried to address this need by having as many people from as many places and organizations as possible dialogue with the many experts who come to New York annually to address the United Nations on East Timor.

We began building interest in the Conference early in the summer by a variety of activities. When Asian Center staff members travelled to Lisbon, Portugal last summer, they attempted to gather materials for an exhibit on the people and culture of East Timor and to invite an East Timorese Cultural Troupe to perform at the Conference. We felt that direct experience with the people of East Timor through an exhibit and cultural show might initiate an interest that would go beyond a perception of the people as only victims of a brutal war. For this reason even though we did not succeed in bringing the cultural troupe, we will continue our efforts to invite them to the United States. (For more information about the Lisbon trip, read Mike Chamberlain's report in the October 1980 issue of *CALC Report.*) Early in the fall, Ramsey Clark, former U.S. Attorney-General, hosted a wine and cheese gathering in his New York law office. A few weeks later, a similar gathering was hosted by the Southern Africa News Collective in Washington, D.C. Together, both gatherings introduced hundreds of people to what was going on in East Timor. At the same time, Mike Chamberlain made extensive speaking tours of the Northeast United States. He addressed colleges and other communities as far east as Waterville, Maine, and as far west as Detroit, Michigan. Extensive mailings were done to publicize the Conference.

All of these activities were successful in bringing together a wide spread of participants at the Conference. We wish we could have brought the Conference to the attention of more people who might have participated in it.

We later learned that the length and timing of the Conference (which was held over a Sunday and Monday) made it difficult for many people who were interested to attend. Nevertheless, some representatives to the United Nations who attended the Conference expressed surprise at the almost two hundred participants who were there. They had not expected even that much interest given their understanding of the cumulative effects of the lack of news about East Timor and the many other issues that occupied the attention of the American public. We are glad that the U.N. representatives are favorably impressed and we will continue our efforts to bring the issue to the attention of more people.

From the feedback that we received, we can conclude that people felt the Conference was worthwhile. Many people described themselves as being overwhelmed by what they learned during the two days. A few people had minor problems with the Conference. They thought that there should have been more emphasis on what the participants could do about the situation in East Timor and they also would have liked the Conference to have more of a workshop character. We felt that the most important aim of the Conference was to provide information, especially since East Timor as an issue has been subject to more distortion that other issues. We too would have liked to be more action-oriented at the Conference. We do have a list of conference participants and we will call on you to act as the need arises in the near future.

Organizing the Conference and preparing this Report were made much easier by the co-operation we received from the Conference panellists. Many of them found time in their busy schedules to cope with our last minute requests. We appreciate all the help that they have given us without which things would not have been possible.

Even though the Conference is over and the Report is now printed, we are still busy with speaking engagements and producing resources. After a year of working on East Timor, indeed our first year as full time human rights activists, we still have problems with organizational skills and lapses in presenting a clear perspective. We are again grateful to those who understood our shortcomings and supported us when we have needed it.

During the next year, we see a lot that needs to be done and we have already started in on them. At the same time that this Report is going to press, we are also printing a poster on East Timor. We are convinced that Carolyn C. King's (the artist) sensitivity has grasped and communicated the horror of the war in East Timor.

Two major projects lie ahead of us now. First is a new documentary film. As many of you know, the only existing East Timor film, *Island of Fear, Island of Hope*, is very dated. So we have begun work on the new film which will be directed by Richard King of *Public Interest Films.* The second project is to travel to Lisbon again for the PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL hearing on Indonesia's crimes against the people of East Timor. The date of the Tribunal is not set but it should be sometime before the summer.

Of course all this takes as much money as it does energy. As usual, we have less money than energy, but if anyone knows how over-extended we feel, then they can imagine our money problems. We were especially hard hit when two grants for East Timor work did not come through last fall as promised. We try not to ask for money too often, but believe us, we need it—so, take a look at the note at the bottom of the inside back cover. We'll say thanks now for helping in any way you can.

What effect will the newly elected Portuguese government have on the future of the East Timorese?

What do Portuguese newspapers have to say about developments concerning East Timor in the U.S.?

What is the status of refugee immigration from East Timor?

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Jill Jolliffe
"Timor Newsletter"
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

EAST TIMOR POSTER

18″ x 27″ in black and white. Original pen and ink by Syracuse progressive artist Carolyn C. King. Send $3 (plus 50 cents postage) for each poster to,

EAST TIMOR HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE • Box 363 Clinton Station • Syracuse, New York 13201

East Timor


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Refugees Still Talk of Famine and Repression

ACFOA

Jill Jolliffe

Jill Jolliffe is an Australian who was reporting from East Timor in 1975 for Reuters news agency. She was forced to leave the island when the Indonesian military invaded, but she has maintained an active concern for the events that have taken place there since. In 1978 she published a book on the recent history of East Timor, and Ms. Jolliffe is now living in Lisbon where she free lances and writes for the Manchester Guardian. *She is in regular contact with the East Timorese refugee community that has established itself in Portugal.*

A very basic and serious distortion about what happended in East Timor in 1975 persists to this day and demands correction. It is that in the closing months of 1975 and in early 1976 East Timor was engulfed in a civil war which cost tens of thousands of lives, and that this war was responsible for the deaths of an estimated 200,000 East Timorese—one third of the population—who are believed to have perished in the years since.

It is a distortion accepted by many journalists and regrettably encouraged by the Indonesian government. In 1975 I was one of many foreign journalists, aid workers and other observers in East Timor who knew that the civil war lasted only about three weeks. From mid-September until December 7, 1975 (when Indonesian paratroopers landed in Dili), peace reigned throughout East Timor, with the exception that Indonesian troops were coming over the border in increasing numbers. The death toll from the civil war, as confirmed by the International Committee of the Red Cross was around 1500 and at most 3000.

Although the civil war had engendered much bitterness between Timorese, there was, after the victory of FRETILIN, an air of national reconciliation in which many followers of the UDT party who remained in the territory declared to us their willingness to work with the FRETILIN adminstration, which had set up a civil administration and adopted a co-operative attitude to the ICRC and to foreign journalists, in sharp contrast to the situation which prevails in East Timor today. Only weeks after I left East Timor, and news of the Indonesian attack on Dili became known to the world, observers were deeply shocked to hear the Indonesian government claim—through a statement made by former UDT leader Francisco Lopes da Cruz, who now worked with them—that 60,000 East Timorese had died 'in the civil war'. This statement, made in February 1976 and later repeated by the then Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik who said that '60,000 or maybe as many as 100,000' East Timorese had died, could only be read to mean that initial reports of wholesale massacres during the landing in December 1975 were correct. Later reports confirmed this shocking view, including those from impartial sources like the Catholic Church, which at the end of 1977 set the death toll as around 200,000. Later sources have claimed as many as half of the original population of 650,000 may have died from executions, bombardment or starvation resulting from the dreadful conditions of the war. While Indonesia occupies East Timor, there is no way of knowing the exact numbers who have died since 1975, but we do know we are dealing with a very large number. The East Timorese community abroad is a community in mourning. Of the approximately 2,000 refugees now living in Lisbon, it is difficult to find one family that is intact.

If we were dealing with past history, perhaps there would be less reason for concern—although this would not change the seriousness of the human rights situation—but we are not. *I believe that at this very moment gross violations of human rights are continuing in East Timor, that as we sit comfortably* *in this room, despite assertions to the contrary, there are bombs dropping in East Timor, there are people imprisoned and being imprisoned without trial, there are summary executions and rape and there is widespread pillaging by the Indonesian military of millions of dollars of relief supplies sent by various governments and humanitarian organisations to relieve mountain villagers suffering from advanced malnutrition.*

Here are some of the more serious violations of human rights which refugees in Lisbon claim are now occurring in East Timor.

A principal reason given by refugees escaping Timor for their flight is that they lack physical security in the presence of Indonesian authorities, and are liable to arbitrary arrest at any time. No such person arrested is given the right of a public trial. There is no free correspondence in or out of the country. All private mail is read by the censor. The Indonesian military frequently enter the houses of private citizens without warrant.

The East Timorese currently have no right to freedom of movement either within Timor or in and out of the country. Villagers are prohibited to move from one zone to another except under exceptional circumstances, and thousands of East Timorese who have applied to leave the country to emigrate to Portugal or Australia are denied that right.

In April 1979 several thousand Timorese who put their names on a list collected by International Red Cross of those who would like to leave the country have since been stripped of all civil rights—

Communique of the Council of Ministers of Portugal

Considering that it is morally, politically and legally incumbent upon Portugal to define a policy aimed at solving the problem of East Timor;

Considering that such definition had not been undertaken in the past, thus impairing the fulfillment of Portugal's obligations towards itself, the Timorese people and the International Community;

Considering that the present Constitutional Government had clearly stated in its program that it would elaborate a policy regarding East Timor;

And considering that any such policy should focus on three fundamental levels, namely, an economic and social aid program for the refugees of East Timor living in Portugal, on humanitarian aid to the Timorese inside East Timor, and at diplomatic level, on the political and legal status of the territory of East Timor;

The Council of Ministers, on a proposal of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, has decided, as of today, the following:

1. Insofar as economic and social aid to the refugees of East Timor now living in Portugal is concerned, the Government hereby adopts an emergency aid program which will also include the carrying out of housing projects already under way, sponsored by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Housing and Public Works; government aid for the launching of a project in poultry farming at the "Quinta da Conraria", through the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries; establishment of additional courses aimed at developing professional skills, especially among young Timorese adults, under the responsibility of the Ministry of Labor; and the allocation of means to the Ministry of Education and Science to resolve pertinent problems in the sphere of education and school adminstration.

The Ministry of Social Affairs, through the Lisbon branch of the Committee on Social Security, shall create the mechanisms required for the rationalization and coordination of all aid given at present by the different departments and official institutions to the Timorese refugees in Portugal.

2. As for humanitarian aid to the Timorese living inside East Timor, Portugal will also in the future participate in the international relief programs under way, namely through the supply of food, clothing and medicines. This contribution will be channelled through the United Nations, the International Red Cross and several Catholic Organizations, and administered, within Portugal by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, on behalf of the Portuguese Red Cross.

Portugal will also propose negotiations with Indonesia, on the understanding that these negotiations will not imply the recognition of the situation prevailing in East Timor, so as to their property has been seized and they have been dismissed from employment, causing considerable hardship to the urban population of Dili.

Of the hundreds of refugees who have arrived in Lisbon in the past two years, all will testify that the right of free association is prohibited and that people gathering in public places in groups larger than three are subject to arbitrary arrest.

The East Timorese have no right to receive and impact information through any media regardless of frontiers. It is a punishable offence for an East Timorese to listen to foreign news broadcasts.

East Timorese parents no larger have the right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children. They are forced to send their children to schools where they must speak a language foreign to Timor, as a result of which many Timorese children have avoided attending schools since 1975, although in some cases have been able to attend clandestine schools run in Portuguese or Tetum, the main indigenous language of Timor.

The picture I am presenting to you, drawn from firsthand testimony of East Timorese who have lived in great unhappiness under the Indonesian occupation is of the absence of a rule of law and the violation of internationally-recognised human rights at every level. This is the picture of widespread human suffering which exists in East Timor today.

There is another side to this picture: the organised resistance of the population to Indonesian rule, and the determination of the East

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discuss the humanitarian issues affecting the Portuguese citizens now in East Timor who wish to return to Portugal, as well as those Timorese who wish to leave the territory under the family reunion program. During these talks, due consideration will also be given to the problem of 65 Timorese who came to Portugal in 1975 and who now wish to return to East Timor.

It is also the intention of the Portuguese Government to enter into talks with the governments of Australia, the U.S.A., and eventually, with those of other friendly countries, so as to try to obtain special facilities for the admission of refugees and immigrants from Timor who may wish to settle in those countries, prompted by the desire to reunite with their families or for other purposes.

3. Lastly, and on the diplomatic level, the Portuguese Government remains faithful to its obligations and responsibilities regarding East Timor, that derive from International Law and the Portuguese Constitution, and formally reaffirms the right of the Timorese people to self-determination.

Considering that the political problem of East Timor is of truly serious national concern to the Portuguese people, and bearing in mind that the policy to be adopted by Portugal regarding the political future of East Timor cannot fail to take into consideration both the views of the nationally representative movements of the Timorese people and the positions of the countries most directly concerned, the Portugese Government will endeavour to hold wide consultations on this matter, both at home and abroad. These consultations shall be carried out:

- *on the parliamentary level, where all political parties represented in the National Legislative Assembly will be asked to express their views;*
- *on the political level, taking into consideration the views expressed by all the nationally representative movements of the Timorese people;*
- *at the diplomatic level, through consultations with all the countries directly concerned with the solution of the problem of East Timor, namely Indonesia (with the understanding expressed in the previous paragraph), the U.S.A., Australia, Japan, China, the Netherlands, the newly independent Portuguese speaking countries, and the members of the European Economic Community.*

After having carried out these consultations, the President of the Republic, in conjunction with the Government of Portugal, will, as laid down in the Portuguese Constitution, set the policies to be followed by Portugal.

September 12, 1980

Timorese not to adjust to this repressive regime. Soon after the invasion of Timor, observers predicted the resistance would be crushed within a few months, given the superiority of numbers and equipment of Indonesian forces against the nationalist guerillas. In the years since, the fortune of the guerillas has ebbed and flowed. Until late 1977 FRETILIN appeared to control most areas outside the urban centres. A series of Indonesian offensives during 1978 and 1979 reduced their strength considerably and threatended their very existence. How, after all, could a peasant army which had received no outside assistance whatsoever in five years of fighting continue against such terrible odds?

The predictions were wrong. Although an important phase of the resistance ended with the death of FRETILIN president Nicolau Lobato in late '78, a re-organised movement has emerged. Early this year, refugees arriving in Lisbon and letters smuggled from Dili spoke of renewed and fierce fighting between guerillas and Indonesian troops in the whole of the eastern zone, where they claimed the resistance had temporarily seized some Indonesian posts and carried off vital weapons. Information arriving more recently filled out the picture, describing how the eastern revolt had been aided by a defection of several hundred Timorese troops, with their weapons, from the Indonesian militia unit HANSIP.

Latest reports from refugees interviewed claim that fighting is continuing in the eastern region to their knowledge, which is nevertheless limited by the fact that travel to this zone is prohibited. Guerilla hideouts there are regularly bombed by the Indonesian air force, they claim. Following the eastern uprising more dramatic news reached Lisbon around August. It was of an attack on Dili itself by the resistance on the night of June 9/10. There are many eyewitnesses to this attack now in Lisbon. They say that on this night guerillas came down from the mountains south and south-west of Dili and struck five points. They engaged Indonesian troops in an exchange of fire until dawn, inflicting some casualties before returning to the mountains. The Indonesian military was thrown into a state of panic. Several days later, army sources in Jakarta acknowledged these events to Reuters newsagency, claiming four of their soldiers had been killed.

A serious of harsh reprisals against the population of Dili, including many arrests, followed, with reinforcements of Indonesian troops and equipment arriving overland from the Lospalos region and by sea from Indonesia.

If, five years after Indonesia initially claimed to have total control of East Timor, guerilla units can strike at the very capital with impunity, which the Indonesian government has admitted, how can we speak of 'adjusting to the realities' of Indonesian rule in Timor? Since all the predictions about East Timor's capacity to resist have proved wrong, it is difficult to make new predictions.

In this context the decision of Portugal, the administering power, to take a new initiative on East Timor is to be welcomed, and it is hoped it will receive the full co-operation in Portugal has promised to consult representative Timorese groups. It is to be hoped that attempts will be made to avoid false solutions which will not bring a lasting peace to Timor. Any solution which does not involve consulting with those leading the guerilla struggle in Timor, no matter how few and isolated they might be would, from my experience, be seen as ignoring the will of the East Timorese people.

Before concluding, I would like to make a brief note on my sources of information, which run contrary to many other accounts. Refugees interviewed have described a regular charade which occurs when foreign visitors are in Timor. Bombers are grounded, soldiers become civilians and war material is hidden and the population is forbidden on pain of imprisonment from speaking to foreign visitors. This is further reason why any negotiations must involve an attempt to make contact with mountain-based guerillas to draw an alternative picture of conditions since 1975, and to create a situation in which any Timorese can freely given information to whoever seeks it. A ceasefire arrangement and a fact-finding international mission would seem to be essential steps in this direction. I do not believe the aspirations of the East Timorese have changed since I first interviewed them in 1975. Like people all over the world, they seek political freedom. They have been cruelly robbed of it, and their resistance to politcal enslavement is one of the most outstanding and heroic in recent history. As the people of the Warsaw ghetto fought in the rubble with their bare hands, so the people of Timor continue to fight against outstanding odds, inspired by national untiy and to defend a long and proud tradition of struggling for liberty. They deserve all our respect and support, and the urgent attention of the world.

* * *

Michael Chamberlain

The Interesting U.S. Campaign on East Timor

Michael Chamberlain is a member of the Syracuse Peace Council and has been working on East Timor as an associate of the Asian Center. Mr. Chamberlain has been travelling around the United States speaking on East Timor. This past summer he visited Lisbon, Portugal to meet with refugees and community leaders, as well as officials of the Portuguese government. Currently he is working on raising funds and researching for a new documentary film on East Timor.

In December of 1975 Indonesia invaded East Timor. At the time I was probably avoiding studying for final exams in cold and snowy Wisconsin. How was I to know *Time* magazine had a brief news article, the *N.Y. Times* an editorial and a few short articles, but then there was silence.

In East Timor thousands of people were being killed by Indonesian troops, but no cry was raised by the United States government or the media here. This was because the U.S. was deeply involved in the illegal invasion of East Timor. Just hours before the invasion President Ford and Henry Kissinger were in Indonesia and they gave, as Jack Anderson put it, "tacit approval" for the invasion. Throughout 1976 and 1977 Indonesian attrocities escalated and so did U.S. military aid to Indonesia. By 1978 the U.S. had increased its military aid to Indonesia a full 2000% over that of the preinvasion years. Much of this aid was used to ravage and devastate the mountain regions of East Timor, killing tens of thousands of people, a total that may well approach half of the population.

At the same time the U.S. government had begun active attempts to end discussion of the East Timor issue in the United Nations and to hide the facts about East Timor before the U.S. Congress and the U.S. public.

According to the Center for Defense Information in Washington, East Timor is the 3rd most violent conflict currently going on in the world. While we have heard the U.S. government come out vocally about other human rights violations, violations of territorial sovereignty and violent conflicts—there has been nothing said about East Timor. We expect that this day and the next will help to change things significantly.

The silence has not gone on unopposed and unbroken. For several years a small, but determined group of people have kept the issue before the U.S. government, media and people. Within the past year though a wider group of activists and organizers have concerned themsevles with the issue of East Timor.

Last December 9th a major push to raise the issue of East Timor in the U.S. public was initiated. At that time the first major public event in years on East Timor was held in New York City. Through the winter the growth of grassroots work began by coordinating different public education projects that already existed in Connecticut, Massachussetts, San Francisco, Upstate New York and the New York City area.

In the Spring those of us focusing our energies on publicizing the issue were able to reach out beyond our established groups. Through many church, human rights and politically progressive groups, information about the war and devastation of East Timor was spread from New York to Los Angeles, from Nashville to Lincoln, and from Tucson to Detroit. By the summer, public programs had been held in over 20 cities, dozens of radio programs had been aired and several local television programs had devoted time to the issue of East Timor.

As a result, many citizens have learned about East Timor and they have written their local news editors, organized their groups and contacted their government representatives about the issue.

Over the summer the work continued. I was fortunate enough to have participated in a visit to Lisbon, Portugal in order to interview refugees from East Timor. During that visit we were able to gain greater insight into the history and culture of the East Timorese from the colonial years up to the past few months. We also had an opportunity to meet with officials from the Portuguese Prime Minister's and Foreign Minister's offices. We informed the Portuguese government of the widespread and growing concern about East Timor in the U.S. The Portuguese were aware of this and were very responsive to our questions about its position on the issue. Just last September they released an official communique which stated clearly their position on East Timor, and pointed out the necessity of the involvement of the United States government, as well as the Australian, Japanese, Dutch, and newly independent Portuguese speaking nations in assuring the right of self-determination for East Timor.

There have been fustrations and failures for our work, I will be frank (I'd like to think that those who know me know that I am frank—sometimes painfully so.) There have been failures and frustrations.

We had wanted to develop a photographic and cultural project for this conference and future programs, but we could not. Part of our trip to Portugal was in order to gather various materials for this. But, Lisbon is in Portugal and not in East Timor—we were not able to gather what we needed. We had hoped to bring a Timorese Cultural Troupe here, but the members of the Troupe who are fortunate enough to have jobs must stay in Portugal to earn a living. If their country is freed soon they will be able to return to their land and culture before it is totally obliterated.

We also intended to mount a campaign of public support for this years U.N. resolution on East Timor. The draft of the resolution did not come out when we expected it, and we could not start the campaign.

Moving on though, this fall while we were preparing for this conference, many public programs took place in many new cities and universities. It seems as though daily we hear of new groups who are interested in learning and working on East Timor.

When these groups do ask us for information we make an attempt to help out by giving them resources which suit their needs best. And this is our perspective on broadening East Timor work. We want to help existing church, human rights and politically progressive groups fit East Timor into programs and perspectives that they already have. In this way groups can instill a consciousness of East Timor as an issue throughout their constituencies, without having to have an East Timor specialist on their staffs. For us this is more than a tactic for getting more groups to work on East Timor. Our attempts to integrate our work with other groups efforts and develop the relationships between the issues surrounding East Timor and other contemporary issues is an embodiment of our personal philosophy on organizational and progressive work. We hope you agree with this philosophy.

Given our collective progress to this point, and our failures, we hope that these two days will be fruitful and that the results will be real and effective.

By our work here today and tomorrow's conference we can raise our voices loud enough to be heard across the street at the U.N., across the miles in Washington and across the oceans to Indonesia and Portugal and to the East Timorese themselves and say we will not allow the silence here to continue.



Mike Chamberlain

Interested in an East Timor Program for Your Community?

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James Dunn

Relief and Diplomacy: A Pattern of Destruction

Four days ago, the 16th of October, was the fifth anniversary of Indonesia's first major military action against East Timor—which took, among others, the lives of five Australian newsmen. In spite of this tragic loss, in spite of the reaction it aroused in Australia, and in spite of an urgent plea to the Australian Foreign Minister from the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), which I was leading at the time, no significant international action was ever taken to persuade the Indonesians not to go ahead with their devious plan to subvert East Timor's right to self-determination. And now, five years later, we have some knowledge of just how much the Timorese have suffered in those terrible intervening years. During that time the power centers of the international community have, for the most part, ignored the plight of the East Timorese. Indeed some countries, among them the U.S. and Australia, have sought to divert attention away from the situation in East Timor. While it cannot be denied that East Timor has been the subject of several international aid programs several international aid programs—mostly from the U.S. and Australia—over the past five years, these have often been ineffectively implemented, inadequately supervised—if supervised at all. The donor governments concerned have been careful to distance themselves from the central human rights issues at stake. From the occasional official statements that have surfaced in Washington and Canberra, one is forced to conclude that the official aid programs have the simple aim of helping Indonesia to cope with a difficult situation into which it was forced by circumstances quite beyond Jakarta's control.

September 1975

What is the pattern of the relief aid that has unfolded, and what relationship has it had to the situation in East Timor?

Firstly, as a Portuguese colony, East Timor was never a recipient of international assistance. In spite of its obvious pressing needs as a very undeveloped country, the old Salazarist regime proudly rejected the possibility of foreign aid on the grounds that this would inevitably lead to further pressures on the Portuguese to declare East Timor a non-self-governing territory and to the risk of outside interference and internal disharmony. The colony's only source of outside assistance was the annual subsidy from Portugal, together with a certain amount of Church aid from Lisbon. Indeed, it was Portuguese colonial pride that prevented the Timorese from attracting economic assistance.

When political circumstances changed in the wake of the Lisbon coup of April 1974, the new regime seemed no longer adverse to the idea of accepting outside help. I was in East Timor in mid-1974 and the hard-pressed colonial regime in Dili was clearly open to any offer of assistance. The idea that Australia might come forward with some timely aid was taken up, but it was

It seems a cliche to say that James Dunn provided the Conference with a unique perspective on East Timor, but in this case it is more than true. Mr. Dunn has a very involved, complex and informed understanding of East Timor. His information and perspective stem from his experiences as: a defense analyst for the Australian Intelligence, the former Australian Consul to East Timor (as well as many other countries), the head of an Australian relief agency team in East Timor during 1975, head of the Australian Parliament's Legislative Research Branch, and most recently as a Fellow at Adelaide University (where he is doing research on a soon to be published book on East Timor.) Mr. Dunn sketched out the history of relief aid to East Timor, and pointed out the diplomatic activities of many nations that contributed to Indonesia's belief that it could ravage East Timor virtually unchallenged.

dropped by Australia early in 1975 in deference to a terse Indonesian reaction to the proposal. This was clearly based on the assumption that international assistance at that time would only serve to obstruct the objectives of Indonesia in East Timor.

It turned out that East Timor was to receive no assistance until fighting had erupted between Fretilin and UDT. For more than a year before that it would have been possible for friendly or interested powers to have given the kind of assistance that might well have injected some stability into the situation—in particular, it might have helped prevent the breakdown in the process of decolonization, which the weak and demoralized Portuguese adminstration was having trouble coping with. Contributions to the decolonization process itself would have been, in my view, greatly welcomed by both the Portuguese and the Timorese themselves. In retrospect, the failure to take up this challenge at that time, when governments were already aware of Indonesia's deliberate actions designed to undermine the independence movement, was nothing less than a deliberately ignored opportunity, which could easily have spared the lives of tens of thousands of Timorese, not to speak of their right to self-determination. At the same time Australian interest in East Timor was stimulated by press reports in early 1975 that Indonesia was about to launch an attack on East Timor. The Timorese were subsequently visited by politicians, trade unionists, students and journalists, and the question of the colony's future was raised on several occasions in the Australian Parliament. Between mid-1974 and August 1975 Timorese leaders visited Australia, the most regular of whom, and still the best known in Australia, was Jose Ramos Horta.

September 1978

Many Australian aid organizations took a close interest in East Timor throughout the fall of 1975—the period which some of us refer to as the Fetilin interregnum. These organizations provided doctors, nurses, and in some cases food supplies. In October and November 1975 our ACFOA team was sent to Dili, with the support of a wide variety of member agencies. We were enthusiastically received by the Fretilin de facto administration and by the population in general. We were allowed to move freely and the aid teams all made full use of this freedom.

We were soon able to make an assessment of the humanitarian situation, which was not as serious as we had anticipated. When the fighting broke out hundreds of Timorese fled by boat and air to Darwin, about 20,000 also crossed the border into Indonesian Timor. In the fighting itself, which lasted about four weeks, between 1,500 and 2,000 Timorese were killed. The health situation had improved, and by November was reportedly largely under control, while the food situation would have been easily manageable if the aid missions had been able to contine their work. The most urgent need, we believed, was to bring an end to the Indonesian military attacks at the border, and we accordingly urged the Australian Government to do its utmost to persuade the Indonesians to stop the attacks.

Although the aid programs were working smoothly, it proved quite impossible to bring pressure to bear on the situation, pressure that could have prevented the tragic events of the past five years. According to my information it was only in late September of 1975 that President Suharto finally reluctantly agreed to allow military intervention to begin, and then only after being convinced by its proponents that the action had the implicit support of Australia, the ASEAN countries, Japan and the U.S.

On the eve of the invasion aid workers were asked to leave the territory by Australian authorities. I believe that Australian and U.S. intelligence knew very well that Indonesia was on the verge of a military operation to annex East Timor. I have information from well-placed sources that Australian intelligence was actually informed that the invasion was going to take place a week or ten days before the date it did, and that U.S. officials talked the Indonesians into delaying the invasion so that President Ford and Dr. Kissinger, who were about to make a short visit, would be well clear of Jakarta when the attack on Dili was launched.



December 1979

Lena Hellvist

The story has been a very different one since the Indonesian invasion of December 7th. For more than three years thereafter East Timor was virtually sealed off from the outside world, with aid agencies being denied access to the territory. Some aid was given through the Indonesian authorities in Jakarta by countries like the U.S., Australia, the Netherlands, Japan and New Zealand. There is a good deal of evidence from sources such as Church officials, concerned Indonesians and the Timorese themselves that much, if not most, of this aid never reached the people for whom it was intended. I have now spoken to hundreds of Timorese who have at one time or another lived in districts where food, medicine and clothing were supposed to be distributed but in 90% of the cases it was claimed that the Timorese received precious little of this kind of foreign aid, most of which was channelled into Indonesian army pockets.

This certainly seems to have been the case in 1976 and 1977 even in the major town areas. Special arrangements were made for those few occasions as when foreign visitors came to the island. One informant said that conditions were appalling until the day before a visit by U.S. Congressperson Helen Meyner in 1977, when there suddenly appeared a supply of new clothing and bedding for the inmates of the center. Unfortunately these items were reclaimed as soon as the visit was over. From the Indonesian point of view the exercise was very successful.

Even if some aid did get through to the people living in the towns, elsewhere in East Timor the East Timorese were left to fend for themselves. In the Fretilin-controlled areas, which in the three years following the invasion accounted for about two-thirds of the population, there was no assistance of any kind. The Indonesians steadfastly refused to countenance a humanitarian mission to this area, insisting that no problem existed that their own Red Cross could not cope with.



May 1980

The case for a humanitarian relief operation received little diplomatic support until almost three years after the invasion. Indonesia's major providers of military and economic aid showed little interest in the Timorese problem and treated with disbelief or disdain the steady flow of reports about the suffering of these people. In mid-1976 the U.S. recognized East Timor as de facto part of Indonesia, and Australia followed suit in January 1978 (when bitter fighting was still taking place). The Timorese were truly a forgotten and abandoned people.

Finally the Indonesians did agree to an expanded aid operation and a very limited foreign presence in its "27th Province." It was agreed that the International Red Cross (ICRC) be readmitted, more than three years after its mission had been forced to flee East Timor. At about the same time the U.S. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) began to work in the territory. The Indonesian decision to allow agencies in appears to have stemmed from increased international pressure on the Suharto Government. In September 1978 the territory was visited by a group of ambassadors to Indonesia, including representatives from the U.S. and Australia, who were reportly appalled at the shocking physical appearance of the Timorese.

The first foreign aid officials to enter East Timor were also shocked at the physical condition of the Timorese. One experienced official described conditions as worse than anything he had seen in Kampuchea or Biafra. These reports were soon endorsed by the articles and photographs sent from Jakarta by the Australian journalist Peter Rodgers. On October 19, 1979, exactly one year ago, the ICRC began a relief operation which was directly at the 60,000 most desperate cases in eight relief centers. This program has clearly been effective and has helped to ease the situation. The death toll in these centers has declined significantly, but progress continues to be slow. For example, only one doctor of the medical staff is not Indonesian. Indeed, Dr. Pascal Grellety and his wife are the only foreign aid official permanently in East Timor and the supervision of key aspects of the distribution of aid remain entirely in Indonesian hands. The ICRC is also precluded from its traditionally important roles of prison visitation and tracing persons who have disappeared.

The CRS program is a more ambitious operation in terms of money, staffing and planning. It is basically a U.S. Government program which is being administered in Jakarta by the CRS. Of the 7.2 million dollars spent up to the end of 1979, 6.9 million dollars came from official U.S. Government sources.

While it is generally acknowledged that the CRS and ICRS have brought about a visable improvement in the situation, both are hampered by the restrictions imposed on them. The ICRC has neither the staff nor the freedom it needs, while critics claim that the CRS has placed itself in the position of being a "subcontracter" for the U.S. Government and is totally uninterested in other aspects of the Timor problem beyond the improvement of the physical environment of the population. In fact some CRS statements seem to endorse the distorted version of what has happened in East Timor that we are accustomed to hearing from State Department representatives.

The Indonesian invasion closed the one bright chapter in the story of international assistance for East Timor. It dashed our hopes that international assistance might play a significant role in the process of decolonization and in ensuring that a proper act of self-determination took place. The Fretilin administration had always been open to guidance and suggestions, and we had no difficulty in gaining their support and assistance in carrying out the work of the foreign aid missions.

Now, it is not enough simply to put some food into the stomachs of the Timorese. The suffering that has been inflicted on these people makes it more important than ever that international agencies seek to establish the truth about what has happened during the past five years, and how the Timorese feel about their present situation and about their future. My recent enquiries in Portugal among the latest arrivals from Timor suggests that the great majority of these people remain deeply hostile to their Indonesian rulers and consider integration to have been an act of brutal, naked aggression.


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SEAL OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
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Kissinger's "Quiet" Diplomacy

Documents have come to light that reveal that Henry Kissinger was the architect of the Ford administration's support of Indonesia. The material is contained in an Australian publication, "Documents on Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, 1968-1975."

One of the most damning pieces of evidence is a secret cable from a high-ranking Australian diplomat to his superiors just a few months before the Indonesian invasion. "The United States might have some influence on Indonesia . . . as Indonesia really wants and needs United States assistance in its military re-equipment programme," the diplomat wired. "But [U.S.] Ambassador [David] Newsom told me last night he is under instructions from [Secretary of State] Kissinger not to involve himself in discussion on Timor with the Indonesians, on the grounds that the United States is involved in enough problems of greater importance overseas at present. . . . The State Department has, we understand, instructed the Embassy [in Jakarta] to cut down its reporting on Timor."

In other words, Kissinger was too busy with global grand strategy to be bothered with the imminent extinction of a small, independent nation of 600,000.

Jack Anderson



What Congress Can Do

Arnold Kohen

The topic of this talk—What Congress can do—should really be turned around to what you can do in Congress, and how to go about doing it. Because without the participation of local groups in this process, it's difficult to talk about realizing the potential that does exist in congress for constructive action on the Timor issue.

First, let me say a few words about actions Congress can take. In theory, Congress can withold foreign aid monies from a particular country for any number of reasons. There are very few places today where Congress would take such action, especially after Iran and Afghanistan. So it's useful to look at other measures that Congress is more likely to carry out.

Congress does pass resolutions on such issues passed a resolution this year on East Timor. This resolution dealt exclusively with humanitarian issues.

Rep. Tom Harkin of Iowa proposed another resolution, which received support from 55 members of the House of Representatives, calling for steps by the U.S. government to encourage Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor and to permit the free exercise of self determination. The chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Lester Wolff of Long Island, let it be known that he was not happy about the Harkin resolution, and although that resolution was proposed in April 1980, Wolff scheduled no hearings on it, and the resolution has been shelved indefinitely. Incidentally, if there are any people who live in Wolff's district, I'd encourage you to write him about his failure to support Tom Harkin's resolution.

I believe that it is a mistake for people to say that action by Congress is very slowly realized or nonexistent, and therefore trying to familiarize Congress with the issues is a waste of our time. It is not the only thing that we can do, but it is one area of activity that should neither be avoided or underestimated as to its longterm impact. Congress is a key arena of public opinion, and of course what we are trying to do at this conference is find ways to influence U.S. and world opinion on the Timor question.

It has not been easy to get Congress to take concrete action on the Timor issue, particularly when such action goes beyond humanitarian issues. But this only tells part of the story. A relatively small number of senators and congressmen can help create a climate of opinion in Washington in which changes are possible. Congress can hold hearings, and has held several on East Timor, that draw public attention to an issue and serve as a sort of public tribunal. Senator Fulbright's 1967 hearings on Vietnam are a good example to keep in mind. Aside from hearings, the actions of interested and committed congressmen pose a question for the Indonesian government—namely whether or not all this negative publicity in the legislature of its strongest ally is worth what Jakarta is gaining in Timor. Nations do make such calculations, and whether or not they reach the right conclusions—

Arnold Kohen, head of the East Timor Research Project, has been working on East Timor here in the United States since 1975. His efforts, along with others in and around Cornell University and Washington, D.C., have kept the issue of East Timor alive in the hearts and minds of many congresspeople and citizens. He has written widely on East Timor and has co-authored a book on the events in East Timor since 1975. Over the past few years he has met and talked with many of the Timorese refugees that have managed to escape from East Timor. Although Mr. Kohen presented a sober characterization of Congress' abilities and responsiveness, he pointed out that by establishing an educational *dialogue with one's representatives in Washington we each can help effectively to change things.*

that is, from the point of view of the people of East Timor—right away, or whether this process takes some time, as it usually does—it does pose a real problem for the aggressor nation, in this case Indonesia.

How does one go about trying to educate Congress on this issue? There are the standard ways—writing your representatives or arranging meetings with them either in your home area or in Washington. Writing letters to local newspapers is another important thing that one can do, then sending the letter to your representatives. One can try to get local organizations or clubs to do the same.

H.R. 6942 Sec. 406

It is the sense of the Congress that the President should take all appropriate measures to —

1. encourage the Government of Indonesia to allow increased access to East Timor by international relief agencies and to allow the establishment in East Timor of humanitarian relief operations by such international agencies;

2. encourage the Government of Indonesia to allow free emigration from East Timor, particularly in the case of families some members of which have previously left East Timor; and

3. encourage the Government of Indonesia to allow access to East Timor by international journalists.

(PASSED)

But what sort of response are you going to get? Unless your congressmen or staff know something about Timor—and even if they do—the usual procedure is for the congressman's office to ask the State Department for answers. Few congressional offices have the time to do their own research on foreign policy issues, so the State Dept. is a key source of information. Remember, every U.S. senator and congressmen gets sacks of mail on dozens of issues.

More likely than not—and again, there are a growing number of outstanding exceptions—you will receive a reply that will sound as if it were written by the Indonesian government, or a skillful publicist. In fact, that is precisely the State Dept's function in this case, to make the intolerable sound reasonable and logical.

Last spring, Mike Chamberlain of the Asian Center drew an information sheet illustrating the response of upstate N.Y. Congressman Jack Kemp to a constituent letter. Mike's sheet carried with it a big warning "DON'T LET THIS HAPPEN, IF YOU GET A LETTER LIKE THIS, WRITE BACK". Mike was right on target, and any effective dealings with Congress have to be based on this principle. It is up to constituents to be persistent and well informed. Both the Asian Center and the East Timor Research Project's Washington office can give you concrete assistance with this problem. You can call or write us and we will get back to you with the facts that we have so you can get back to your representatives with hard questions. And this pertains to all the issues surrounding East Timor—self determination, human rights violations, food and medical aid, and so on.

I cannot stress the importance of being well informed strongly enough. Naturally, most people neither have the time nor the facilities to know everything about each issue, and no one is expected to be able to do this. So let's reverse the order: the official-sounding letter on congressional stationary is most often no more than a State Department propaganda handout. Do not assume that this is necessarily the attitude of your own representative: he or she is merely passing on a message obtained from official U.S. sources. Constituents need to have their own agenda and know the issues at stake. Otherwise, it is hard to see how the particular representative will be moved to do anything. Keep in mind that official lies about any number of issues, the Indochina war and Iran, to name only two, have persisted many years after these lies have been authoritatively exposed. Most representatives do not keep a running file on the lies or their exposure. It is up to constituents to bring the facts to their attention—whatever the myth may be.

H.R. 638

BE IT RESOLVED, that the House of Representatives call upon the President to immediately —

1. increase humanitarian assistance to East Timor by providing to East Timor through non-governmental organizations more food, commodities, medical supplies, and funds;

2. encourage the Government of Indonesia to allow the free emigration of those East Timorese wishing to leave the country and to allow international relief personnel and journalists free access to East Timor;

3. establish a United States presence in East Timor to monitor the distribution of relief aid and the emigration of East Timorese; and

4. encourage the Government of Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor and to allow an internationally supervised election in which the East Timorese can freely exercise their right of self-determination.

Myths and Fallacies

The U.S. government was not aware of Indonesia's intentions towards East Timor in 1975.

U.S. Intelligence was informed about the imminent Indonesian invasion of East Timor. Reportedly, the date of the invasion was postponed to make sure that it would not precede or coincide with a state visit by President Ford to Indonesia. Since then, the U.S. government has been aware of the situation. In 1978, U.S. Ambassador Masters visited East Timor but he failed to alert people to the widespread starvation he witnessed.

Most of the deaths that have occurred in East Timor were due to a civil war and the famine which resulted from it.

The civil war lasted three to four weeks during the fall of 1975, after which international relief agencies entered East Timor. These agencies reported that the fighting had ended and that approximately 1,500 to 2,000 people had died. The food situation then was considered not unmanageable and brighter than expected. Most of the deaths occurred during the famine which followed Indonesian military operations in 1977, 1978 and 1979.

The famine which "began" in 1978 was due to changes in climatic conditions and a breakdown in agricultural.

The reason that agricultural methods "broke down" was that the Indonesian military had forced the people out of the mountain farmlands into the resettlement camps by napalming and defoliating their villages and crops. This scorched-earth policy has left the land barren and uncultivable.

There was some "severe malnutrition" before, but relief efforts have improved those conditions.

Photographs of people in East Timor taken this past summer, as well as recent refugee reports, contradict these statements. At the same time relief programs remain limited.

The best way to help East Timorese now is to assist Indonesia in its development efforts.

The effects of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor in these five years far outstrips the negative effects of 400 years of Portuguese colonialism. Accepting Indonesia's control of East Timor is accepting the usurpation of the Timorese people's rights and condemning them and their culture to death.

Indonesia has been cooperating and has allowed international relief agencies, observers and journalists into East Timor.

Indonesia has allowed only two international relief agencies into East Timor and it has placed restrictions on these agencies, such as allowing only four non-Indonesian relief workers in East Timor. In addition, no group is being allowed to visit prisons or trace persons who have 'disappeared.' Visits by other observers and journalists are restricted.

The U.S. government is doing everything that it can for the East Timorese and it has their best interests in mind.

The U.S. is simply protecting an ally and its own complicity in the widespread violations of human rights in East Timor. The U.S. has not assumed the role of responsibility that Portugal and other countries have called on it to take. If the U.S. would oppose the Indonesian occupation of East Timor Indonesia may very well have to withdraw.

Indonesia is a strategic ally of the U.S. which the U.S. cannot afford to antagonize.

Indonesia has little strategic importance for the U.S. Indonesia does not have the capability to oppose the U.S., as it is too dependent on the U.S. militarily, economically and politically.

U.S. military aid to Indonesia is used for Indonesia's defense.

Most of Indonesia's military acquisitions are counterinsurgency weaponry, such as those used in East Timor, rather than strategic defense weaponry.

U.S. military aid to Indonesia was stopped after the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.

During the supposed 'aid suspension' from January to June 1976, four offers of new military equipment were made, including an offer of Rockwell OV-10 Broncos. At the same time, significant amounts of military equipment were delivered.

East Timor should logically be a part of Indonesia.

This is an idea originating from the Indonesian government and those who like to see nice lines on maps. East Timor is ethnically and linguistically different from Indonesia and has been distinct from Indonesia especially after 400 years of Portuguese colonialism. There is no basis for such a statement.

The Indonesian takeover of East Timor is a fait accompli; *the fighting has ended.*

The resistance to Indonesia's occupation continues. This past summer, attacks were mounted on several cities, including Dili- the capital, for the first time in years. These areas were long thought to be secure. Internationally, resolutions calling for Indonesia's withdrawal from East Timor have gained support in the past few years in the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Nations Conference and the Interparliamentary Union.

Fretilin is a communist threat to the region, and therefore should be eliminated.

Independent assessments of credible individuals and organizations, including international diplomats and church sources, as well as FRETILIN statements, deny this charge. This is a simple case of red-baiting. FRETILIN has enjoyed the widespread support of the people of East Timor since 1975.

Things will return to normal in East Timor once the resistance to the Indonesian takeover is ended.

Already, Indonesia has disrupted severely the indigenous social, economic, educational and political structures of East Timor and has attempted to replace them with Indonesian institutions. Bahasa Indonesia has been assigned as the official language and the Indonesian government has said that it plans to maintain the social organization of the resettlement villages, thus totally altering the social fabric of East Timor.

The media has had little access to information on East Timor since 1975 and this has caused the lack of media coverage.

While the Indonesian government has not allowed journalists into East Timor on an unrestricted basis, and while there has been a blackout on information about East Timor, the media has had ample credible sources to run stories on the issue. However, the media refused to cover the issue and on occasions, it has suppressed eye-witness accounts of Timorese priests and refugees.

EDUCATE YOURSELF and ...

.... ORGANIZE OTHERS

These are some of the perspectives which we hope that concerned people can use and develop, along with some of the things that can be done to help. The importance of letterwriting cannot be stressed. East Timor seems to fit well into a number of different organizational activities and this is the best way to work on East Timor, by drawing the relationship between it and other ongoing problems.

Anthropologists; Cultural, Ethnic, Minority Rights Groups

Indonesia has mounted a military and cultural assault on the East Timorese people that has wiped out an estimated one-third to one-half of the population. At the same time 60% of the surviving Timorese have been forced out of their villages and indigenous social structures. Indonesia has already attempted to introduce Bahasa Indonesia as the official language and it has embarked on a program of repopulating East Timor with people from the over-populated island of Java. There has been a systematic attempt to wipe out the East Timorese and their indigenous cultures. This needs to be recognized and presented as a real issue in order to understand fully what development programs under the Indonesian government will mean for the Timorese people.

Lawyers Guilds and International Law Groups

Not only is Indonesia's invasion of East Timor a violation of territorial integrity and international law but it is also in violation of the U.S.-Indonesian Mutual Defense Agreement (1958). The actions and policies of the U.S. government may also have been illegal. The U.S. has supplied military equipment and made new offers of military equiment to Indonesia continuously since the invasion, in apparent violation of the human rights sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.

An International People's Tribunal will be held in Lisbon, Portugal during May 1981, at which time the violations of international rights and laws by Indonesia will be deliberated. While this tribunal will also examine U.S. complicity in these violations, no examination of the U.S. government's violations of its own laws has been undertaken.

Church Organizations, Hunger Coalitions, and Relief Aid Organizations

What has been the cause of the starvation that has led to hundreds of thousands of deaths and many other people's suffering in East Timor? Why is Indonesia continuing its attempts to restrict the activities of international relief agencies in East Timor? Why hasn't Indonesia allowed the United Nations, UNICEF, or independent observers free access to East Timor? Why won't Indonesia allow East Timorese to leave their country freely?

By the reports of Father Leoneto do Rego, a Portuguese Catholic priest who lived in the mountains of East Timor between 1976 and late 1978, the Indonesian military ravaged the villages and crop areas, forcing the people into the resettlement camps where Indonesian Army-controlled relief programs were disastrously inadequate and corrupt. Raise these facts and issues within your groups. Call on Indonesia to grant access to East Timor for all international relief agencies and ask the U.S. government to encourage this. Call for an accounting of the relief distribution program and an adequate international staff to monitor the process.

Student Groups and Student Associations

Support and endorse the United States Student Association (USSA) resolution on East Timor that is included in its 1980-81 platform. Use that as an organizing tool in your school.

United Nations Associations

The United Nations has passed six General Assembly and two Security Council resolutions calling for Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor. The most recent resolution was passed last November 1980. In your association's activities and discussions, raise the issue of East Timor and how its case bears on questions of international law and human rights. Support the most recent resolution within your association and send copies of your endorsed resolution to the State Department, the Permanent U.S. Representative to the Fourth Committee of the U.N., and to your legislators in Washington.

Human Rights Organizations and Amnesty International Groups

Independent investigators and Amnesty International Representatives have found that prisons, political prisoners and disappearances of persons are severe problems in East Timor. Yet no one has been allowed in by the Indonesians to investigate the situation. In addition the people of East Timor are denied their basic rights to personal and property safety, freedom of education, freedom of movement, freedom of information or communication, freedom of assembly, freedom from arbitrary arrests, and the right to trial.

Peace & Anti-war Activists and Third-World Solidarity Groups

East Timor is an instance where U.S. military aid to a foreign government has made the destruction of a people and their rights possible. In this case 90% of the arms used for the invasion and occupation of East Timor were supplied to Indonesia by the U.S. It was the dramatic increase in U.S. military assistance in 1977 and 1978 that made much of the devastation possible.

The struggle of East Timor for freedom has been recognized and supported by many Third World liberation groups and there are strong ties between the Timorese and many of them. Relationships need to be drawn between what is happening in different areas of the world. Freedom, peace and social justice are not the goals of the East Timorese alone. Without U.S. aid, Indonesia would have to withdraw from East Timor. Peace and Freedom would then return to East Timor.

Bookstores and Newsletters

Stock your shelves with some of the available resources on East Timor. Write regularly about East Timor in your columns.

What You Can Do

1. Educate yourself.
2. Educate and organize others:
    - Hold a community program on East Timor with a speaker, slides, or a film,
    - Write your Congresspeople and Senators to express your concern,
    - Display an East Timor Poster,
    - Write your local news media editors,
    - Write the State Department and President.
3. Remember
    - *Don't* let a letter from an official put you off. Some of our representatives, church officials, and news editors have been misinformed by the U.S. State Department or the Government of Indonesia.

U.S. Interests and Policy Toward East Timor

Adm. Gene LaRocque

Admiral Gene LaRocque (retired) has a life-time of experience in the military and in the Pacific. Although he currently heads the non-governmental Center for Defense Information, he spent thirty-one years in the United States Navy. During that time he was attached to the Pacific fleet and later worked in Washington as a defense strategist for the Pacific area. The Admiral testified before Congress this past June on the issue of East Timor and expressed his concern for the compromising effects of the U.S. policy toward East Timor. It was his organization that targeted East Timor as the most violent conflict taking place in the world today in a report that it published late last year.

A Center for Defense Information study released one year ago identified 37 major and minor armed conflicts around the globe. It singled out the five year old war in East Timor as the most violent in the world, involving the greatest loss of life in terms of percent of the population killed. Fighting continues today, and the United States continues to ship weapons to Indonesia for use in East Timor.

The war is not over in East Timor. On June 10th of this year, Fretilin launched a major effort to regain Dili, the occupied capital of East Timor, and several other towns as well. Since then, there have been reports of an impending Indonesian offensive, as fresh Indonesian troops and new equipment are apparently flowing into East Timor. Thousands of Indonesian combat troops occupy East Timor.

Meanwhile, the United States has pledged over $32 million of military weapons to Indonesia for the coming year. In contrast, the U.S. government has provided only $13 million in humanitarian assistance for East Timor over the past year.

The United States has provided Indonesia with the weapons used to attack East Timor contrary to the U.S.-Indonesian Mutual Defense Agreement, the Human Rights section of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act and the provisions of the U.N. Charter.

As a military man with 31 years in the Navy—many spent on duty in the Pacific and many in strategic planning in the Pacific area—I would like to focus my remarks today on the subjects of American military interests in East Timor and Indonesia, and American military assistance to Indonesia.

The U.S. government has provided much of the military hardware used by the government of Indonesia to conduct military operations in East Timor because lowlevel U.S. policy makers have assumed that other factors in the Indonesian-American relationship override the right of the people of East Timor to determine their own future. It is my view that the minor political or economic gains the U.S. may achieve by helping Indonesia do not justify American support of a military invasion by Indonesia.

From a purely military point of view, East Timor is no threat to the U.S. or any country in the region. As an independent country, East Timor would serve the interest of peace and tranquility in the region. East Timor is too small, poor, and underdeveloped to be a military threat to anyone in the foreseeable future. There are no useful military base facilities in East Timor. East Timor has no navy or air force and could probably never develop any military capability beyond territorial defense. Its very weakness makes it a prey for larger, more powerful neighbors.

The only possible military value of East Timor is its location

Most Violent Conflicts in Today's World

CONFLICT	NUMBER OF DEATHS	YEAR THE CONFLICT BEGAN
Kampuchean Civil War & Revolution	**500,000 to 4 million**	**1970**
Afghanistan Civil War	**100,000 to 250,000**	**1978**
East Timor War	**100,000 +**	**1975**
Lebanese Civil War	**50,000 +**	**1975**
Sino-Vietnamese war	**30,000 +**	**1979**
Philippine Guerrilla Wars	**30,000 +**	**1972**
Guatemalan Civil Violence	**22,000 +**	**1967**

at the edge of Ombai-Wetar strait on the northern coast. The Ombai-Wetar strait could be used for the submerged passage of U.S. existing Poseidon missile submarines, but the installation of the Trident missiles in U.S. missile subs and the near deployment of the first Trident submarine eliminate any possible requirement for U.S. use of the Ombai-Wetar strait as a route to the Indian Ocean. The United States does operate missile subs in the Indian Ocean, but on an irregular basis.

The conclusion then is that East Timor is of no military concern to the United States or other countries. It deserves attention not for military reasons, but because of rational concern for the welfare of a weak and oppressed peoples struggling for survival.

Let me turn to Indonesia.

Indonesia is an important nation but is also of little military importance to the United States. The U.S. has no military treaty with Indonesia and Indonesia provides no support of any kind for American troops stationed in the Asian theater. There are no American military bases or facilities or combat troops in Indonesia. There is little need to use Indonesian airfields or ports because of the proximity to major naval and air bases in the Philippines, as well as extensive U.S. military facilities in Guam, Diego Garcia, and Australia. One indication of Indonesia's limited military importance to the United States is the fact that neither Secretary of Defense Brown nor Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jones, mention Indonesia in their Reports to the Congress this year.

Indonesia does not contribute to the defense of the United States. Most of Indonesia's weapons are acquired for use in the adjacent island areas.

The primary U.S. military interest in that area is the unimpeded passage through the straits of the Indonesian archipelago. Two of the four Indonesian straits, the Straits of Malacca and Lombak Straits, are important to the United States. Nearly all commercial vessels go through the Malaccan Straits. Supertankers, large warships, and submariens must go through the Lombak Straits. Since the U.S. Pacific Fleet conducts operations in the Indian Ocean, it also needs to traverse those straits. The alternative is the much longer route around the southern coast of Australia.

The United States and other nations are not in danger of having their right of passage denied no matter what stance they take on East Timor. It is doubtful that Indonesia would be inclined to impede the transit of foreign vessels. Even when the U.S. suspended all military aid to Indonesia during the Sukarno years, these straits were not closed to American vessels. If Indonesia wants to express political displeasure, it surely will choose a less risky means of doing so than trying to stop passage of foreign war ships or merchant ships. Clearly the United States and other nations can employ their navy to keep the straits open if they choose to do so.

In sum, the U.S. has no military interests of overriding importance in Indonesia. It certainly has no military interests which should blind it to the Indonesian actions in East Timor. Indonesia does provide the U.S. and other nations a significant quantity of oil, but this should not prevent nations everywhere from curtailing sales of weapons to nations violating the basic rights of humans. American military assistance and the diplomatic acquiescence of many nations have been essential to Indonesia's war effort in East Timor. Regrettably these are the facts. During the invasion of East Timor, 90% of the Indonesian weapons were made in the United States. For the year just before the Indonesian invasion, the United States pledged 450% more military assistance to Indonesia than the previous year. U.S. military weapons have furthered Indonesia's development of the jungle forces it uses in East Timor. U.S. weapons enabled Indonesia to luanch its two major offensives of the war in 1977 and 1978 and deliveries of American OV-10 Bronco aircraft changed the entire nature of the war.

To recount all the good things the Indonesians do, when I was a boy—I grew up in Chicago—we used to say Al Capone wasn't such a bad fellow because he used to help the poor in the town, give money to churches. So we decided to lay off Al Capone. He was a far greater danger in the longrun than any little bit of good he might have been doing.

Mr. McHugh. That is how you view Indonesia?

Admiral LaRocque. I certainly do in terms of East Timor.

House of Representatives, June 10, 1980

Weapons supplied by foreign countries which are used for suppression of people in another country, engender hostility and reduce the right of men everywhere to live in freedom. Indonesia is an obvious case where the world knows that weapons provided by a foreign government are not used for defense of Indonesia, but instead are used to suppress a neighbor and acquire territory. The United States and most nations of the world oppose aggression.

The U.N. General Assembly has declared the "incorporation" of East Timor by Indonesia invalid. I urge everyone to encourage our government to support the position of the General Assembly of the U.N. on East Timor and use political, economic, and military leverage, including reductions or suspension of U.S. security assistance, to persuade the government of Indonesia to withdraw all troops from East Timor and allow the East Timorese to decide their own fate

Solidarity

The last evening of the conference was a cultural get-together at the Community Church. Representatives from many third-world nations came to sing and dance in solidarity with the people of East Timor. The evening was a vibrant display of harmony between the struggling peoples of the world. There was an ebb and flow between the soft gracefulness of the traditional classical culture, and the syncopated and energetic grace of the traditional folk cultures. Mr. Abilio Araujo, an East Timorese and a member of Fetilin, closed the evening with the inspiring poetry and music of his own people. It was our feeling that the energy created that evening brought all of the people there closer together. There was a feeling that all those who were singing and dancing and listening were doing so for a sisterhood and brotherhood of freedom, in East Timor and around the world. The following are two songs which Mr. Araujo sang.

Mike Chamberlain

Through Music, Dance and Poetry

Kolele Mai: What is the Reason

Kole lele mai rode kokodele ke le mai
Kole lele mai rode kokodele hele laloi kolele mai

What is it that makes your corn not grow?
What is it that makes your rice not flower?

Kole lele mai rode kokodele ke le mai
Kole lele mai rode kokodele hele laloi kolele mai

What is it that makes your stomach not full?
What is it that makes your sweat not dry?

Kole lele mai rode kokodele ke le mai
Kole lele mai rode kokodele hele laloi kolele mai

Some say you are lazy, some say you are stupid
Some say it is stupidity, others say it is poverty

Kole lele mai rode kokodele ke le mai
Kole lele mai rode kokodele hele laloi kolele mai

What is the reason for it?
Who, who, is really responsible?

Kole lele mai rode kokodele ke le mai
Kole lele mai rode kokodele hele laloi kolele mai

Mount Ramelau

Eh! Mount Ramelau, Mount Ramelau, eh!
What is higher than your peak?
What is greater than your majesty?

Why, Timor, is your head forever bowed?
Why, Timor, are your children enslaved?
Why, Timor, do your children doze like chickens?
Why, Timor, do your children doze like slaves?

Eh! Mount Ramelau, Mount Ramelau, eh!
What is higher than your peak?
What is greater than your majesty?

Awake! The foot of the mountain is white
Awake! A new sun has risen

Eh! Mount Ramelau, Mount Ramelau, eh!
What is higher than your peak?
What is greater than your majesty?

Open your eyes! A new sun is over your village
Open your eyes! A new sun is over your land

Eh! Mount Ramelau, Mount Ramelau, eh!
What is higher than your peak?
What is greater than your majesty?

Awake! Take the reins of your own horse
Awake! Take command of our own land!

Eh! Mount Ramelau, Mount Ramelau, eh!
What is higher than your peak?
What is greater than your majesty?

INDONESIA:

What is at Stake in East Timor

Benedict Anderson

It is important to understand that the Suharto government's attempted annexation of East Timor has had devastating consequences not only for that country, but also for Indonesia, and that this government's misrepresentation of the true facts to the outside world has been matched by no less serious misrepresentations to its own people.

Indonesian nationalism has long been a deep and powerful force, sufficient to sustain the country through over thirty years of political and five years of armed struggle against Dutch colonialism. At no point in that long struggle for independence did any significant group express the slightest interest in Portugal's remote Southeast Asian colony. Only when this 400-year old colony threatened to free itself from colonialism, thirty years after Indonesia's proclamation of its own independence, did a Jakarta government decide to intervene. This historical record shows that it is utterly false to claim that the "annexation" of East Timor is a response to deeply-felt, long-standing ties of national brotherhood.

The utter irrelevance of the attempted annexation to Indonesian popular nationalism is signally demonstrated by the Suharto government's domestic handling of the issue, and by a variety of other evidence that I will shortly present. While Jakarta's closing of East Timor to foreign correspondents since the initial invasion of December 7, 1975—broken only briefly and damagingly at the beginning of this year—is well known, a more significant indication of its bad conscience has been the even tighter internal censorship of and control over news about the realities of East Timor. From 1975 to the present the Indonesian mass media have steadily been obliged to maintain the palpable fiction that East Timor was rescued from radical Fretilin insurrectionaries by loyal East Timorese integrationists and brotherly Indonesian "volunteers." Virtually nothing has been reported to the Indonesian public about the fierce counter-insurgency campaigns of 1977-79 which may have cost the lives, by violence, disease and malnutrition, of 200,000 East Timorese "brothers." More telling still, although the Jakarta forces have lost at least 2,000 dead, and possibly as many as 10,000 wounded, these—and indeed any casualty figures—let along the names of the dead, have been kept secret. Though these losses are the Indonesian military's most severe since the national revolution, the families of the dead and wounded have been left to nurse their grief in bitter silence: there have been

Benedict Anderson is a Professor of Government and Asian Studies at Cornell University. He has been studying and writing on Indonesia for twenty years, and has an intimate knowledge of its political developments, its history and its culture. He has testified several times before Congress on the matter of human rights violations in Indonesia, and on the Indonesian involvement in East Timor.



no public ceremonies for the fallen or bestowal of decorations for valor in action. The real reactions of different groups of Indonesian to the calamity in East Timor is revealed by: horrified reports circulating within the Indonesian Catholic clergy; semi-standardized bribes paid by military men to personnel officers to avoid service in East Timor; reports of fragging of officers by their men; and the recent description of the East Timorese nationalists by a top Indonesian student leader, as comrades in the struggle against oppression by the Indonesian government.

Diplomatically, the cost of the East Timor adventure to Indonesia has been very high. For a nation intensely proud of acting as host to the historic first Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, and of the late President Sukarno's prominent role in the world-wide fight against colonialism, it has been an enormous humiliation to have the claimed "integration" of East Timor repeatedly repudiated by the U.N. General Assembly, and to find only 7 out of 93 delegations supporting its claim at the most recent Non-Aligned Nations Conference. Even the United States has been forced to concede publicly that no valid exercise of the East Timorese people's right to determine their own future has ever taken place. A well-respected scholar-official of the U.S. State Department has gone so far as to write that "Our initial response to the East Timor case was probably indefensible on legal grounds." These stinging rebuffs have been impossible to conceal from the Indonesian people, and the Suharto government has been at a total loss to offer its people any plausible, or creditable, explanation.

Jill Jolliffe

Last December 4, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke told the U.S. Congress that, at that time, no less than 200,000 people in East Timor (over one third of the entire population) were living in what he and Jakarta call "resettlement areas." The real nature of these resettlement areas was revealed by *New York Times* correspondent Henry Kamm's January 1980 interview with an agricultural specialist working with the Indonesian military in East Timor, who said that the plan for removing and concentrating these people had been drawn up "largely for strategic reasons, placing the population where the army can control it." He added that "the resettlement project will make East Timor *permanently dependent on food imports.*" Coffee, traditionally East Timor's main foreign exchange earner, has, since the invasion, been monopolized, warlord style, by a company called P.T. Denog Hernandez International, dominated by General Dading Kalbuadi, commander of the Indonesian invasion forces. Coffee bought up from East Timorese farmers at 30-40 cents a kilogram has been resold in Jakarta for as much as $13 a kilogram. The devastation has been such that in the last year at least $9,000,000 have had to be contributed by outside agencies for emergency relief.

If all this were not enough, the Suharto government, which has repeatedly tried to justify its actions by claiming that East Timor is not economically viable and cannot support its population, has recently designed the region a transmigration zone where peasants from Indonesia will be relocated. With doubtless unconscious irony, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Manpower, Transmigration, and Cooperatives, Mr. Urip Widodo, stated last January 14 that "It is impossible to develop this vast province with the small number of people living there." In fact it is clear that the transmigration program is to serve not economic needs, but a political strategy: the physical Javanization of East Timor.

Yet the economic costs are not being borne by the people of East Timor alone. The people of Indonesia also have been, and will in the future be, the losers. If East Timor becomes permanently dependent on food imports as a result of Jakarta's policies, those imports will only add to Indonesia's already huge external food deficit. In 1977-78, Indonesia had to import 2.6 million tons of rice—about one third of the total amount of rice on the world market—as well as one million tons of wheat. Today, rice-growing Indonesia is the world's largest importer of rice, and is likely to continue to be so. Aside from the heavy financial costs of counter-insurgency campaigns and military occupation, any serious attempt to "develop" East Timor by Jakarta will mean further difficulties for a population whose daily per capita income is around 60¢.

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"Development" of East Timor will mean diversion of resources from an Indonesian society, where life has been declining for a decade, and where the lowerest 20% of income earners gleans 7% of total income, while the top 5% gains almost 34%. On December 4, 1979, the American Ambassador to Jakarta, Mr. Edward Masters, told the U.S. Congress that:

> The neighboring province of East Nusa Tenggara ... (is) in the best of times ... one of the poorest parts of Indonesia. It has the lowest per capita income in the nation—barely $32 per year (i.e. about 10¢ a day) ... Sixty percent of (its) pre-school children ... suffer from malnutrition.

Can an Indonesian population of this kind, already saddled with over $15 billion dollars in outstanding external debts, endure all the additional burdens of the East Timor adventure?

Finally, at various times, and to various audiences, the Jakarta government has suggested that its actions in East Timor have been taken with Indonesia's security interests at heart, How sincere this concern has been from the very start can be judged by then Foreign Minister, now Vice President, Adam Malik's light-hearted letter to Fretilin representative Mr. Jose Ramos Horta in 1974, in which he specifically said that independence was the right of every country "with no exception for the people of Timor," adding that Indonesia had no ambitions in East Timor, and sought good relations with "whoever will govern East Timor in the future after independence." Can we really suppose that Mr. Malik would have been permitted such a written statement if Indonesia's security had honestly been thought to be threatened? A further clear proof of Jakarata's insincerity in this regard is that its main arms purchases over the past five years have been Rockwell OV-10s, F5E jets, and, most recently, A-4 Skyhawks. Of all these planes it could be said what an American official has recently written of the Skyhawks, namely that they are "ground-support aircraft of no conceivable use except against insurgents and as a symbol of military modernization." In other words, all of these purchases have been made, not to defend Indonesians from any credible external threat, but to annex a country that, in the words of Rear Admiral Gene La Rocque to the U.S. Congress, "is too small, poor, and under-developed to be a military threat to anyone in the foreseeable future."

In summary I believe that the attempted annexation of East Timor represents nothing more than the short-sighted aggrandizement of the small military-dominated clique that now rules in Jakarta. The policy commands negligible popular support and is in violation of long-standing nationalist tradition. It has proved extremely costly to Indonesians, if not their government, in terms of a damaged international reputation, of lives lost, of families stricken, and of economic suffering, and is certain to continue do so. Although the Suharto government has expressed fears that an independent East Timor might serve as a base for "communist aggression," Jakarta's relations with the Soviet Union are sufficiently cordial that it receives significant economic aid from Moscow; a reopening of relations with the Chinese People's Republic has been under discussion for some time now, and General Benny Murdani, architect of the East Timor aggression, recently visited the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to act as "honest broker" between Hanoi and the ASEAN states on the question of Kampuchea.

Once we recognize that the occupation of East Timor in no conceivable sense represents any real national interest of Indonesia's 143,000,000 population, what then can and should be done to end it?

I would like to make the following three proposals:

1. The United Nations firmly maintain their principled stand on the East Timorese people's right to self-determination, and their repudiation of the Suharto government's attempted annexation.
2. The U.N. use its Good Offices to encourage the government of Portugal to resume, temporarily and in all disinterestedness, its decolonizing responsibilities. Surely, after colonizing the people of East Timor for more than four centuries, the people of Portugal feel a moral obligation not to surrender them cynically to another colonialism? I believe that the generally constructive role played by Lisbon since 1974 in the decolonization of its former African colonies, confirms my faith. In addition, recent statements by the democratically-elected government of Portugal point in the same promising direction.
3. I suggest that the U.S. should use its great influence in Indonesia in congruence with world opinion, and begin to pressure the Suharto government towards a complete withdrawal from East Timor. Lisbon is clearly ready to assist the U.N. in organizing a procedure whereby its former colony can decide its own future in accordance with the U.N. Charter. At the same time, we should maximize relief to the East Timorese. This would not mean merely pouring more money and supplies into existing woefully undermanned relief agencies, but rather increasing assistance under effective international supervision and inspection, to insure that this assistance reaches the mouths of the East Timorese, not the pockets of the Indonesian military. It would mean insisting on free access to East Timor by the world press; on permitting the East Timorese to escape from the "resettlement villages" and return to their ancestral homes; on an end to summary executions, arbitrary, secret imprisonment, and censorship; on freedom for those wishing to leave East Timor to do so; and on the return of East Timor's coffee economy to those who actually produce it. I am confident that the ending of Indonesia's annexation will in the end improve the lot of both the East Timorese and the Indonesian peoples.

U.S. ARMS TRANSFERS TO INDONESIA

NUMBER	WEAPON	DATE
16	Rockwell OV-10 Bronco counterinsurgency aircraft	1974
3	Destroyers (ex-USN)	1974-5
3	Lockheed C-130B transport aircraft	1975
36	C-G V-150 Commando armored cars	1975
3	patrol boats	1976
3	Bell 47G helicopters	1976
2	Bell 206B helicopters	1976
16	Rockwell OV-10 Bronco counterinsurgency aircraft	1976-7
21	Beech Musketeer light trainer aircraft	1976-7
2	Beech King Air 100 transport aircraft	1976-7
--	Rockwell T-2C Buckeye trainer aircraft	---
4	Northrop F-5F trainer aircraft	On
8	Northrop F-5E fighter aircraft	Order
16	Bell 205A helicopter	1978
16	Beech T-34C armed trainer aircraft	1978
16	McDonnell Douglas A-4M Skyhawk II fighter aircraft	1978

Institute for Policy Studies

Shepard Forman

Inside East Timor's History and People

Shepard Forman, who formerly taught anthropology at the University of Michigan, is now with the Ford Foundation. From August 1973 to October 1974 he and his family lived and conducted research among the Makassae people in East Timor. During that fifteen month period, he must have come to know and love the people of East Timor very much. That knowledge and love was still very evident in his speech and slide presentation on East Timorese culture during the Conference.

The invitation to speak to you today about physical and cultural genocide in East Timor leaves me somewhat in awe. The words are very heavy ones, and I would like to unload them and talk instead about the substance of the situation in East Timor as I understand it. I must confess that my knowledge about the current situation is second-hand, derived from accounts in the press and from personal reports from friends and acquaintances who have received letters and other communications from their friends and relatives there. What is apparent from all these accounts is the terrible extent of human suffering, that is, the dimensions of the tragedy. What I would ask us all to think about today is the magnitude of the plight of the East Timorese people. Perhaps the best way to accomplish this is to learn about East Timor as I knew it in 1974 and in that way perhaps obtain a fuller sense of what we have lost.

According to all reports, the population in East Timor has been decimated, with perhaps as much as one-third to one-half of these indigenous people dead; that is, estimates ranging upwards to 200,000 people out of a population of some 650,000 people just five years ago. Countless others have been forceably dislocated from their traditional homelands in the mountains to encampments along the coast where they live under deplorable conditions. The loss of life is grim enough in itself, but I am also concerned with the long-range physical and cultural effects of warfare and induced starvation on the East Timorese people. We can have, for example, no knowledge of the long-term effects of massive malnutrition on the future development of young people in East Timor, or, for that matter, on the prognosis for full recovery of the adults who have suffered with them through this long campaign of military warfare and deliberate economic and social disruption. We do know that the destructive power of Western technology has been put to awesome use against small-scale societies whose very survival is now at stake.

When my family and I first went to East Timor in August of 1973 we encountered a diverse population of 650,000 people divided into integral socio-cultural systems along ethno-lingustic lines. East Timor was under Portuguese colonial authority then—by no means the most ideal of situations—but the social system was at least whole and relatively healthy; in some ways, thriving. It was, as my wife and I mused as we took up residence there, a good place to raise our children. There has been a lot said about continuous hunger and deprivation in East Timor prior to the terrible events that the East Timorese have confronted since the Indonesian invasion of 1975. Indeed the horrible dimensions of the killing and starvation are masked by statements that the tribal economies of these East Timorese societies were always insufficient to permit the East Timorese people to live full and satisfying lives. I would contest this. Certainly, East Timor as we knew it was not a land of plenty, but it was a land of sufficiency in which people grew enough to eat and even trade. The Makassae, of the East Central highlands around Quelicai, among whom we spent 15 months doing anthropological research, were a fully functioning and evolving social, political and cultural entity. There were, of course, years when lack of rain or too much rain lessened the production of corn and rice, this latter consumed only on ceremonial occasions and sold in small quantities to the Chinese for cash to pay the Portuguese head tax. But the Makassae subsisted on beans, yams and other root crops, managed to raise their water buffalo and terrace their magnificent rice fields, and harvest enough rice, corn and legumes for their ceremonies and their exchanges in the bustling Sunday marketplaces. They were a people who carried themselves with great dignity in the beauty and majesty of their traditional

Helen Hill

mountain habitat, working lands inherited by their fathers and their fathers before them. Of course their lands became subdivided and overworked, and the Makassae were known to talk about cold and hunger. They suffered from several diseases endemic to the island. But still, the characteristic markers of malnutrition and starvation were not to be seen anywhere. There were no children with bent legs and bellies swollen from the edema of hunger. There were no deaths from starvation in this system in which kinfolk shared even at moments of greatest difficulty. And lastly, and most importantly, the population of East Timor generally and of the Makassae, in particular, was clearly increasing, sufficient demographic evidence to lay to rest any claims that the island economy simply could not support its population.

The Makassae then may have been poor in our material terms of reference, but rich in a sociocultural tradition that should be the envy of any living people. Their territory was organized sociopolitically along the lines of patrilineal kinship, and their religious system was based on cosmological beliefs about the interchange between humans and nature that provided for the continual regeneration of life. This Makassae life paradigm, which evidenced a solemn and sacred belief in mother earth and father sky and power of the ancestors, was enacted in a series of marital and mortuary and agricultural rituals which integrated Makassae actions with their beliefs. The removal of the Makassae from their ancestral lands and the disruption of their social and economic and cultural systems is more than a simple matter of the relocation and resettlement of a population. It is the destruction of a significant mode of life, of a way of being, which held the meaning of life for the Makassae as a people, and which should have meaning for all of us.

The real issue before us now is what can be done. The immediate problem, of course, is the fate of the hundreds of thousands of East Timorese who remain encamped or wander the countryside and who are desparately in need of food and medical attention. Unfortunately, the food and medical aid that has reached East Timor to date seems to have been and continues to be as much a matter of politics as of welfare. The international community must insist on full and free access to East Timor if programs of emergency aid are to reach the target populations and be of full benefit to them. Then, we must begin to think about what can be done to reconstitute the integral social and cultural systems that were in place in East Timor before the tragic events of the past five years. There is no doubt in my mind that the East Timorese people should be allowed to return to their traditional territorial homelands and that redevelopment of the island's economy should be undertaken with full respect for their social and cultural and political traditions as well. This means, at the outset, that the very boundaries to East Timor, which have now been opened by the Indonesians to inter-island migration, should be closed again so that indigenous populations do not have to compete with Javanese and other migrants who would usurp their lands and put them to work in the interest of a developed export agriculture.

With their traditional homelands assured, the people of East Timor should be allowed the freedom of choice which all international convenants allow them. While my family and I were in East Timor, living among the Makassae, we were privileged to witness the first act of self-determination by the people of East Timor. As I described in my 1977 Congressional testimony on human rights in East Timor, the Makassae, although illiterate, are perfectly able to express and act on their political choices. In an impressive demonstration of political will, they descended from their mountain homes to the administrative post at Quelicai in significant numbers in 1974 to mark their preference for local autonomy with a simple X or thumb print. Presaging their own convictions about the future of the colony, the young Portugese army officers—who would later turn their garrisons over to the Timorese people—decreed that this Makassae area would be the first democratic political domain in East Timor, ending a long succession of demands for autonomy in the region. After 500 years of colonialism, peace and freedom were near at hand. Little wonder that the Makassae and other East Timorese sociocultural groups have been so tenacious in their resistance to the denial of their long-sought rights.



Unfortunately, the future of peace and autonomy briefly promised to the East Timorese continues to be denied, and there is much work still to be done. I am encouraged by the incredible effort of the East Timorese support groups which now exist in this country and Europe and Australia and by the extraordinary efforts of the few individuals who have managed to keep alive the sad tale of the East Timorese people in the press and other media circuits that were for too long indifferent and even acquiescent. Now, more than ever, we must work together to insure an orderly transition in East Timor to a political status which will be, reasonably, of the people's own choosing. And we must work toward the recovery of the rich and variegated social and cultural systems that the East Timorese (and we) are dangerously close to losing forever. This, of course, is crucial for the survival of East Timorese society. But beyond that, I cannot help but think that the destiny of the East Timorese is also a measure of our own humanity.

Noam Chomsky

Too Esoteric to Fit the Print

Noam Chomsky hardly needs an introduction. He is a professor of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and he has been an outspoken critic of U.S. foreign policy for more than a dozen years. He has written and spoken extensively on East Timor, testifying several times on the issue before the United Nations. The text that follows are excerpts from an earlier statement that Prof. Chomsky had written for the Asian Center, rather than the speech he gave at the conference, as he did not speak from a prepared statement. Just two weeks after the conference Prof. Chomsky joined forces with James Dunn to speak before a large crowd in Boston.

Why should we devote attention to East Timor, a small and remote place that most Americans have never even heard of? There are two reasons, each more than sufficient. The first is that East Timor has been, and still is, the scene of enormous massacres and suffering. Many of the terrible things that happen in the world are out of our control. We may deplore them, but we cannot do very much about them. This case is quite different, hence far more important. What has happended and what lies ahead are very much under our control, so directly that the blood is on our hands. The second reason is that by considering what has happened in East Timor since 1975, we can learn some important things about ourselves, about our society and our institutions. If we do not like what we find when we look at the facts—and few will fail to be appalled if they take an honest look—we can work to bring about changes in the practices and structure of institutions that cause terrible suffering and slaughter. To the extent that we see ourselves as citizens in a democratic community, we have a responsibility to devote our energies to these ends. The recent history of Timor provides a revealing insight into the policies of the U.S. government, the factors that enter into determining them, and the ways in which our ideological system functions.

On December 7, Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion, capturing the capital city of Dili. Ther attack took place a few hours after the departure of President Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger from Jakarta. There is no serious doubt that the U.S. knew of the impending invasion and specifically authorized it. Ford has conceded as much in an interview with Jack Anderson, 9 November 1979 while claiming ignorance of the exact circumstances (*Washington Post*).

The invading Indonesian army was 90%—supplied with U.S. arms. In Congressional Hearings, government representatives testified that the U.S. had imposed a 6-month arms ban in response to the invasion, but this was so secret that Indonesia knew nothing about it. Arms continued to flow, and in fact new offers of arms were made, including counterinsurgency equipment, during the period of the "arms ban," as was conceded by adminstration spokesmen when the facts were exposed by Cornell University Indonesian specialist Ben Anderson. The invasion was bloody and brutal. Subsequently Indonesia extended its aggression to other parts of the territory, and by 1977-8 was engaged in a program of wholesale destruction including massive bombardment, forced-population removal, destruction of villages and crops, and all the familiar techniques used by modern armies to subjugate a resisting population.


TROUBLE IS, YOU START TELLING PEOPLE THEY HAVE HUMAN RIGHTS...
THEY BEGIN TO BELIEVE IT-

Brickman

The precise scale of the atrocities is difficult to assess, in part because Indonesia refused to admit outside observers, for reasons that are readily understood. If the facts were not known in the West, it was the result of the decision not to let them be known. It appears that of the pre-war population of about 700,000, perhaps one quarter have succumbed to outright slaughter or starvation caused by the Indonesian attack, and that the remaining population, much of which is herded into military-run concentration camps, may suffer a similar fate unless properly supervised international assistance is forthcoming on a substantial scale. Relief officials who were finally permited limited access to the territory after almost four years describe the prevailing situation as comparable to Cambodia in 1979. The world reaction has been somewhat different in the two cases.

The U.S. government continued to provide the military and diplomatic support that was required for the slaughter to continue. By late 1977, Indonesian supplies had been depleted. The Human Rights Administration dramatically increased the flow of military equipment, enabling Indonesia to undertake the fierce offensives that reduced East Timor to the level of Cambodia. The U.N. General Assembly met immediately after the invasion, but was unable to react in a meaningful way. The reasons are expalined by U.N. Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan in his memoirs: "...the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations proved utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success."

Ambassador Moynihan was presumably aware of the nature of his success. He cites a February 1976 estimate by the deputy Chairman of the provisional government installed by Indonesian force "that some sixty thousand persons had been killed since the outbreak of civil war"—recall that 2-3000 had been killed during the civil war itself—"10 percent of the population, almost the proportion of casualties experienced by the Soviet Union during the Second World War." Thus in effect he is claming credit for "success" in helping to cause a massacre that he compares to the consequences of Nazi aggression, not to speak of the growing number of victims in the subsequent period. Ambassador Moynihan commented further that the Indonesian invasion must have been successful by March 1976, since "the subject disappeared from the press and from the United Nations after that time."

It did virtually disappear from the press, though not from the United Nations, which has regularly condemned Indonesian aggression (most recently in December 1979). The curtain of silence drawn by the press in the United States and much of the West for four years hardly demonstrates the success of Indonesian arms, though it does stand as a remarkable testimonial to the effectiveness of Western propaganda systems.

Throughout, the U.S. government has pretended that it knew very little about events in East Timor, an obvious fabrication. Or else government representatives claimed at each stage that though there might have been some atrocities at the outset, the situation is now calm and the sensible course is to recognize Indonesian control. This was, for example, the stance taken by the government in 1977 Congressional Hearings, at exactly the time when Indonesia was preparing the murderous offensives of 1977-8 and when the Human Rights Administration was accelerating the flow of arms for use in these military operations. The U.S. government persists in its policy of supporting Indonesian terror while denying its existence, and as long as the media loyally refrain from exposing the facts. This report is typical not only in its claim that "now" things are finally improving (the constant plea throughout) but also in its failure to concede that questions even arise about the period after March 1976.

The picture is a bit different when we turn to Timorese witnesses. One of the most impressive of these is Father Leoneto Vierira do Rego, a 63-year-old Portuguese priest who spent 3 years in the mountains with Fretilin before surrendering to Indonesian forces in January 1979, suffering from malaria and starvation. After imprisonment and interrogation, he was permitted to return to Portugal in June. His accounts of what he had observed were then widely reported in the world press, outside of the United States. Shortly after the appearance of the government report cited above, Father Leoneto was interviewed by the *New York Times.*

Refugees continue to report large-scale atrocities. By 1979, some foreign aid was reaching the territory, but distribution is largely under Indonesian military control. A report in the London Observer (20 January, 1980) notes that "All relief work in the former Portugese colony is being supervised by only four foreign field workers." The U.S. government is trying to stem the increasing flow of exposures and to guarantee Indonesian control over the miserable remnants of the U.S. backed Indonesian assault.

For four long and bloody years, the U.S. media, with very rare exceptions, kept close to the U.S. government propaganda line. During 1975, there was considerable coverage of East Timor, a reflection of the concern over decolonization in the former Portuguese empire. An Australian journalist, the first to enter East Timor after the August civil war, wrote a lengthy report in the *London Times* in which he rejected allegations of Fretilin atrocities, which he attributed to Indonesian and other propaganda services. His report appeared in the *N.Y. Times,* edited to make it appear that the charges were accurate, as *Newsweek* reported, basing itself on the *N.Y. Times* account. After the Indonesian invasion, reporting in the U.S. diminished rapidly, approaching zero (apart from occasional U.S. government and Indonesian propaganda handouts).

By late 1979, the truth was beginning to break through, even in the U.S. press, and a number of congressman, notably Tom Harkin of Iowa had become aware of the true nature of what had been concealed by the media. The *N.Y. Times* ran an honest editorial on December 24, 1979, and James Markham filed the first report on the many Timorese refugees in Lisbon (28 January, 1980).



The *Christian Science Monitor* had published several accurate reports by January 1980, and other journals too have begun to present some of the information that has been available for four years, though much distortion persists and the crucial U.S. role is generally ignored or downplayed.

The importance of the behavior of the media and journals of opinion during these years cannot be overemphasized. The events described by Father Leoneto and many others, and the horrendous consequences that are now at last widely conceded, are the direct responsibility of the United States government, and to a lesser extent, its Western allies. Correspondingly, these monstrous acts could have been—and still can be—brought to an end by withdrawal of direct U.S. support for them. The U.S. government has been backing the Indonesian military not because it takes pleasure in massacre and starvation, but because the fate of Timorese is simply a matter of no significance when measured against higher goals. Since 1965, when the Indonesian military took power in a coup that led to the slaughter of perhaps 500,000 to 1,000,000 people, mostly landless peasants, Indonesia has been a valued ally. In comparison with these overriding considerations, it is natural that the Human Rights Administration, like its predecessor, will pour arms into Indonesia to enable it to achieve its ends in East Timor, and will attempt in every way to conceal the truth.

The importance of the deception becomes clear when we observe what happens when the system of indoctrination begins to unravel. However institutions may function, individuals are not prepared to support actions that verge on genocide. As the truth has begun to break through, a number of members of Congress and increasing segments of the population are beginning to demand an end to these atrocious acts. One result has been that some aid is being sent, though without adequate international supervision it is doubtful that it will reach those who need it, given the corruption of the Indonesian military. There is, for the first time, a real possibility that pressure will be put on the U.S. government to stop providing the military supplies that Indonesia requires, and that international efforts may be organized to induce Indonesia to withdraw, so that the remnants of the population that survive may have the opportunity to realize their long-sought right to self-determination.

It is intriguing to see how some segments of the media are reacting to the fact that information about East Timor is now beginning to reach the public. In the *Washington Journalism Review* (March 1980), Richard Valeriani of NBC and Asia specialist and former foreign correspondent Stanley Karnow discussed one of the reports on East Timor that appeared in the *N.Y. Times* in late January 1980. Valeriani said that he read it, thought "I don't care about Timor." Karnow couldn't bring himself even to read the story: "I just didn't have time...There was no connection; it didn't have anything to do with me." Their point was that the *Times* was giving *too much coverage* to the insignificant fact that massacres in Timor rival those of Cambodia and that the population has been reduced to the state of the miserable victims on the Thai-Cambodian border as a direct result of U.S. policies.

Their reactions are not unique. The U.N. correspondent of the *New York Times,* Bernard Nossiter, refused an invitation to a press conference on East Timor in October 1979 on the grounds that the issue was "rather esoteric," and in fact reported not a word on the U.N. debate, which included testimony from Timorese refugees and others on the continuing atrocities and the U.S. responsibility for them.

Perhaps the most intriguing response to the recent breakdown of media suppression is that of the *Wall Street Journal,* which devoted an editorial to the topic (6 February 1980). The *Journal* takes note of "an interesting campaign" that "has been shaping up over the past few weeks on the issue of East Timor." It observes that 100,000 people may have died during the war, adding that

> It sounds suspiciously like Cambodia, some people are saying. And this one is ours: Indonesia is our ally and oil supplier, it's American arms that the Indonesians used to perpetrate their atrocities.


SENSATIONALISTS!

But this charge, the *Journal* continues, "tells less about Timor than it does about certain varieties of American political thinking." There are two factors that crucially distinguish Timor from Cambodia. The first is that the U.S. is sending some aid to Timor and the Indonesians, "however grudgingly and imperfectly," are letting the food in, whereas "the Cambodians would be in considerably better shape if the Soviet Union undertook comparable behavior for itself and its ally"—the editors choose to ignore the fact that the Soviet Union provided aid to starving Cambodians long before the U.S. did, and, it appears, in far larger quantities, as well as the fact, reported by international aid workers, that their aid was let in not at all grudgingly. But the crucial distinction, which deserves quotation in full, is this:

> But more important, it's self-deluding to talk as if the U.S. had the power any longer to determine the outcome of a situation like Timor. The violence that has cursed the place is the wholly unsurprising mark of a disintegrating world order; talk about the evils of U.S. power is likely to hasten that disintegration, not arrest it. Those worried about the human costs of such chaos might do well to start facing up to that connection.

The reasoning is not without interest for students of contemporary propaganda. The editors are trying to tell us that when U.S. supplied helicopter gunships demolish villages, destroy crops, massacre mountain tribesmen and drive them to concentration camps, we are to understand these facts as "the mark of a disintegrating world order," not the results of U.S. actions, consciously undertaken. And if the U.S. were to withhold the crucial military and diplomatic support that enables Indonesia to carry out these policies, the terror would be even worse, since its cause is purely abstract. One wonders whether *Pravda* rises to such intellectual heights when it justifies Soviet support for the Ethiopian war in Eritrea.

It is easy enough to make fun of *Wall Street Journal,* but that would be to overlook the more significant point. The slight exposure of U.S.-backed Indonesian atrocities during the past several months has frightened the Indonesian military, the U.S. govenment, and the business circles represented by the *Wall Street Journal,* all of whom want to play their games with people's lives in secret. The message is clear. By significantly extending the pressure on the U.S. government to abandon its appalling policies, and continuing to work to bring the facts to a larger public, one can contribute materially to the survival of the people of East Timor. It is rare that an opportunity arises in which a relatively small amount of effort may save thousands of lives, and it would be criminal to allow it to pass.

RESOLUTION ON EAST TIMOR
UNITED STATES STUDENT ASSOCIATION 1980-1981 PLATFORM

The USSA is opposed to the United States role in support of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. Direct support has included Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger supporting the invasion the day before it began while in Indonesia. It includes paying 90% of the cost of the invasion, helicopters that strafe and napalm villages.

Since 200,000 of 700,000 East Timorese have been killed, international observers and relief have been banned, and the U.S. media have blacked out the whole tragedy. USSA supports Rep. Tom Harkin's resolution with 55 cosponsors to investigate the U.S. role in the invasion.

The USSA also supports the efforts of the Red Cross, the United Nations and many church relief agencies to observe, supervise a ceasefire, and provide food relief.

The USSA insists the U.S. cut-off all aid to Indonesia until such time all rights of self-determination are established for the East Timorese, and cut all complicity with the destruction of that society. And we criticize the U.S. media for their virtual blackout of all these facts.

A History of the War

1974	**April 5**	Military coup in Lisbon ends a 50 year dictatorship, its overseas territories are granted the ability to decolonize. East Timor begins forming the structures for this.
	October	Indonesia begins radio broadcasts expressing hostility to East Timorese independence.
1975	**January**	UDT and FRETILIN enter into a pro-independence coalition.
	June	After a visit to Indonesia to meet with government and military officials, UDT breaks the coalition with FRETILIN.
	August 10-30	Immediately after a visit to Indonesia's capital, UDT stages a "show of force," arresting and executing FRETILIN members. FRETILIN is defended by Timorese soldiers from the Portuguese garrison.
	September 7	The "Civil War" ends, leaving FRETILIN in *de facto* control after the Portuguese Governor had withdrawn.
	September 11	Overseas journalists and aid teams visit and report widespread support for FRETILIN which acknowledges Portugal's continuing sovereignty.
	October 16	Five Australian journalists reportedly slain by Indonesian troops during an attack on East Timor from Kupang (Indonesian Timor).
	November 28	FRETILIN declares East Timor's independence after resisting 2 months of Indonesian aggression with little outside support.
	December 4	General Ali Murtopo states that Indonesia is preparing to intervene.
	December 5	President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger arrive in Indonesia on a State visit. During discussions with Indonesian President Suharto, "tacit approval" is given for the invasion.
	December 7	Indonesia launches an air, sea, and land invasion of East Timor, during which Australian journalist Roger East is exeucted; killing is indiscriminant. Many Timorese follow FRETILIN into the mountainous interior.
	December 8	The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council call for Indonesia's withdrawal without delay. The *N. Y. Times* and *Washington Post* call on Congress to weigh heavily Indonesia's "felonious and forcible" invasion. Portugal breaks relations with Indonesia. Indonesia responds by claiming it has no troops in East Timor.
	December 25	Indonesia launches a 2nd offensive, Australian Intelligence is reported as putting the Indonesian troop size at 15-20,000. U.S. press coverage dries up.
1976	**January 9**	London *Guardian* cities Australian Intelligence monitoring information as reporting widespread killing of non-combatants by the Indonesian forces.
	February 15	Lopez da Cruz, Vice President of the Indonesian created "Provisional Government of East Timor," says that 60,000 are dead from the fighting.
	March 3	Rep. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) proposes the first Congressional amendment calling for the eliminating of military assistance to Indonesia in light of the East Timor invasion. (Defeated).
	April 22	U.N. reaffirms resolutions calling for Indonesia's withdrawal.
	July 17	Indonesia announces the formal incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia as its 27th province.

	September	The U.S. delivers the first of the 16 Rockwell OV-10 Broncos it is to supply Indonesia.
	December 1	U.N. reaffirms resolutions calling for Indonesia's withdrawal.
1977	**February 11**	James Dunn, former Australian Consul to East Timor, reports that East Timor "might well constitute ... the most serious case of contravention of human rights facing the world at this time."
	March 4	The U.S. State Department claims, during Congressional hearings, that atrocities by Indonesia in East Timor have ended; days later, Australian Intelligence is reported as putting the death toll in East Timor at 70-80 Timorese per day.
	July	U.S. State Department admits in Congressional hearings that Indonesia's troops are supplied "roughly 90%" with U.S. arms.
	September	New Indonesian offensives are reported by Australian Intelligence. A French journalist who 'slipped into' East Timor reports Indonesian troops are "systematically wiping out villages." The U.S. State Department denies these reports.
1978	**January**	There are renewed offensives including aerial bombardment of the interior regions. Crop growing is seriously disrupted.
	September	Diplomats and journalists are allowed to visit with Indonesian guides. Journalists report an urgent need for relief; the visiting U.S. Ambassador Masters remains silent. Indonesia refuses requests to allow the International Red Cross (ICRC) and other such groups entry after three years of absence.
	December 31	FRETILIN President Nicolau Labato is killed in combat.
1979	**April**	Indonesian military allows the ICRC to conduct a preliminary survey. A subsequent report says that "tens of thousands of people displaced by military operations were facing starvation." Indonesia fails to expedite relief programs to East Timor.
	July	The ICRC returns for a second survey of 13 villages. Although the ICRC did not visit the areas described as the hardest hit by starvation, it reported that 60,000 of the 75,000 people it visited were in "an alarming state of malnutrition;" 20,000 were in "a calamitous condition" and would die whether aid reached them or not.
	September 10	The ICRC and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) begin relief programs to about 300,000 people, but have a limited foreign staff (four). Local staff are reportedly under the influence of the Indonesian military.
	November	ICRC officials say the situation may be worse than Biafra and potentially worse than Kampuchea. Photographs taken by an Australian journalist support this.
	December 4	Renewed Congressional hearings, in which the systematic diversion of aid by Indonesia's military is noted by Rep. Harkin, demands an accountability from our aid programs in East Timor.
	December	Father Leoneto do Rego (Portuguese-Catholic Priest) discounts U.S. State Department and Indonesian Government claims that "geoclimactic and environmental factors" caused the famine. He states that massive bombings of the mountainous regions, where he lived in 1978, uprooted the population and prevented crop growth.
1980	**January**	The *N.Y. Times, Washington Post* and *Christian Science Monitor* have printed editorials and articles pointing out recent refugee reports of continuing Indonesian atrocities and a continuing famine. Refugees reportedly are paying $2,000-2,500 in bribes to leave East Timor; the Indonesians are only allowing the ethnic Chinese to leave.
	March 23	London *Observer* reports that the ICRC and CRS were not being allowed sufficient access to assess the relief operations. One relief official, who had recently visited

	Kampuchea, said that "medically the East Timorese are in a worse state than the Khmers," and noted that the relationship between the Indonesians and the Timorese were as "master and slave."
April	*Manchester Guardian* reports a regrouping of Timorese nationalist forces and a growth in active resistance. The Center for Defense Information reports that East Timor is the most violent conflict taking place in the world in terms of proportions of the population killed.
June 10	Congress hears testimony from Amnesty International, the Center for Defense Information and the Chairperson of the East Timor Refugee Commission on East Timor. The U.S. State Department denies that executions and disappearances are still occurring. Contrary to State Department claims of stability throughout East Timor, FRETILIN forces launch coordinated attacks on the capital city, Dili.
June-July	Indonesia responds to FRETILIN's attacks by arresting hundreds of Timorese, many of whom were tortured. Executions were reported by the *Far Eastern Economic Review,* which cited church sources. Further fighting is reported.
July 25	*N.Y. Times* again condemns Indonesia's occupation and war, calling for a political settlement through Portugal with eventual independence for East Timor.
September 17	Portuguese government issues a communique calling for diplomatic consultations and a resolution to the East Timor question.
November 11	The U.N. reaffirms its 8th resolution calling for a recognition of East Timor's right to self-determination.





11 The Sydney Morning Herald, Wed, Oct 22, 1980 11

Refugee saw reporter shot

CANBERRA.—A Timorese refugee has told Australian Embasssy officials in Lisbon that he saw the Australian freelance journalist Roger East put against a wall and shot by Indonesian troops in Dili in 1975.

A Foreign Affairs spokesman said in Canberra that the refugee was interviewed after embassy staff talked to another refugee, Mr Pedro Lai, about statements made to journalists last week concerning Mr East.

The spokesman said the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Peacock, had instructed the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to pass on the new claims to the Indonesian Government.

He said the new account was consistent with that given by Mr Lai, who said he saw Mr East's hands tied with wire before Indonesian troops led him from a park where people had been taken by Indonesian forces.

Mr Lai also said he had heard machine-gun fire after Mr East was led away, struggling and spitting at his captors.

Jose Ramos-Horta

The Issue Remains and So Does the Resistance



Milton Grant - U N

The case of East Timor is a most tragic one. On 7 December 1975, East Timor was invaded by the armed forces of Indonesia, under the pretext of "liberating" the East Timorese people from "Portuguese colonialism" at a time when the new Government in Lisbon decided to grant self-determination and independence to the people of the territory. Indonesia's military intervention was carried out with a clear purpose: to challenge the process of decolonization initiated by the Portuguese Government. No one in East Timor solicited Indonesia's intervention to "liberate" us from "Portuguese colonialism". All the East Timorese political groupings in the territory were cooperating with the Portuguese authorities in order to work out a comprehensive programme of decolonization, leading to free elections, with direct participation of the entire population, without external interference. Regardless of the excuses and arguments, the Indonesian military invasion of East Timor was a clear-cut act of military aggression, a gross violation of the United Nations Charter, and of International Law.

Indonesia ignored calls by the United Nations to withdraw from East Timor and instead increased its military aggression against the poeple of East Timor. Thousands of people were killed, tens of thousands of families were left homeless. Entire villages were razed, and crops destroyed. The crimes committed by the Government of Indonesia, and the destruction perpetrated by its invading army, turned East Timor, once a bountiful land, into a prairie of fire and destruction, with no precedent in the entire history of the island.

The United Nations has adopted a total of seven resolutions on the question of East Timor, reaffirming the right of the people of the territory to self-determination and independence, and calling upon Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor. The Non-Aligned Countries reaffirmed the right of the the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence in 1976 and 1979. Throughout the world, governments, political parties in the Western countries, religious organizations, such as the World Council of Churches, trade unions, student's organizations, human rights groups, have repeatedly condemned Indonesia's military intervention in East Timor and demanded the withdrawal of its troops from the territory. However, the Government of Indonesia has defied the entire international community in an arrogant manner and has continued its military operations.

Five years after Indonesia's invasion of East Timor or of Indonesia's "liberation" of the East Timorese people from "Portuguese colonialism," the result speaks for itself: one-third of the population of the territory have died from the war, famine caused by deliberate destruction of crops, by diseases due to and lack of medical assistance, mass executions, and weapons, such as napalm, defoliants and poison gas.

The Government of Indonesia has claimed that a "people's assembly" voted to incorporate East Timor into Indonesia on 31 May 1976, a futile attempt to win some sort of legitimacy to its annexation

Jose Ramos-Horta has been instrumental in keeping his country's cause from being forgotten in international and diplomatic circles. Mr. Horta, who has been involved with Fretilin since its founding, is now Fretilin's Minister for External Affairs and their representative to the United Nations. In his handling of East Timor's international affairs Mr. Horta has received wide respect throughout the international community and he has worked tirelessly to find a solution for his fellow Timorese.

of East Timor. The Government of Indonesia had picked puppets in Dili, and through them it set up a so-called "people's assembly." No elections took place even in Dili itself. Suffice it to say that even the U.S. State Department refuses to accept Indonesian claims that the people of East Timor have decided freely to accept Indonesia's incorporation of their territory. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke acknowledged that no act of self-determination took place in East Timor during congressional hearings last June.

The United Nations did not take part in any procedings leading up to the formation of the so-called "people's assembly," and the Security Council resolutions 384 (1975) and 389 (1976) had not—and have not—been complied with by the Government of Indonesia. Therefore, any claim by the Government of Indonesia that the people of East Timor has decided to accept the annexation of their territory, other than by force of arms, is absurd and ridiculous. We should all be aware by now of the many tricks played by illegal and repressive regimes to cover up their neo-colonial designs. It is too fresh in our mind, the futile attempts by the now defunct regime of Ian Smith-Muzorewa to win international legitimacy with an "internal settlement." In Namibia, the racist regime of Pretoria has been trying for years to deny the Namibian people their sacred right to self-determination. It is ironic to hear Indonesia of decolonization hear Indonesia speak on matters of decolonization when it is denying the people of East Timor their right to self-determination? Where is the morality of the Government of Indonesia to criticise the racist regime of South Africa when both Pretoria and Jakarta are guilty of the same arrogant defiance of the United Nations resolutions? Where is the morality of the Government of Indonesia to talk about Israeli annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip while it annexed East Timor by brutal force and annihilated one third of the population of the territory? How can Indonesia speak on the principles of self-determination and independence when Indonesia has trampled upon the rights of East Timor, and has been responsible for the death of one third of the entire population of the territory, a tragedy which is of greater magnitude than the tragedy of the South African people or the Namibian, or the Palestinian people, in terms of number of people killed?

United Nations

We have also heard the Indonesian Representatives claiming "achievements" in East Timor. Few more roads were built, one or two schools were inaugurated, a soccer field and a new football team ready for a good shows; "boys-scouts" have been established, etc. All this would serve to justify Indonesian annexation of East Timor and the slaughter of tens of thousands of East Timorese people. The Government of Indonesia seems to want to make a mockery of human rights and the sacred rights of peoples to determine their own future.

For five years the people of East Timor have been fighting heroically for their sacred rights and they are continuing to wage a heroic resistance against the foreign aggressors. In spite of some difficulties, in terms of military supplies, the people of East Timor, under FRETILIN leadership, have achieved great victories. In the course of this year, the East Timorese National Liberation Army—FALINTIL—inflicted heavy casualities on the Indonesia army, and destroyed a large number of armored cars, trucks, and military installations.

On January 5 a major FRETILIN attack against an Indonesian military convoy on the road from Dili to Manatuto left 20 Indonesian soliders dead. During the month of February, several mutinies took place in Indonesian military barracks. A shoot-out ensued when some soldiers refused to obey an order to march into a FRETILIN stronghold in the Lospalos region. Several soldiers were killed or wounded, while others fled into the bush and joined FRETILIN forces. During the month of March, the resistance forces launched a series of small-scale attacks against Indonesian positions in four separate areas. On April 25 another Indonesian post was the target of mortar barrage. The shells exploded inside an Indonesian military barrack, killing and wounding 50 soldiers. The same day, an Indonesian helicopter was shot down nearby. On May lst, an Indonesian convoy of three trucks, one armoured car, one armoured car, and 20 soldiers were ambushed on the road from Dili to Aileu. FRETILIN forces recovered all the available weaponry. On May 20, the sixth anniversary of the independence struggle, FALINTIL soldiers marked this historical date with several attacks against Indonesian military units located in four cities. A total of 100 Indonesian soldiers were killed.

The most serious FRETILIN operation was carried out on the night of June 9th to 10th against Indonesian positions in the occupied capital, Dili. More than 200 FRETILIN soldiers took part in a three-pronged attack against an Indonesian military unit stationed in the outskirts of the capital and a local TV station, while another group blocked the exits of the city. An Indonesian military unit six milies south of Dili was also overrun by FRETILIN forces and held for several hours. Hundreds of villagers who came from the mountains with the freedom-fighters carried away boxes of ammunition, rifles, hand grenades, and other types of weaponry. In the meantime, the local TV station was destroyed.

This attack launched against Indonesian forces right in the occupied capital, caught the Indonesians completely by surprise. The next day, top Indonesian officers from the Bali Regional Division flew to East Timor to assess the situation and to boost the morale of the army. Three days later, warships arrived from Lombok, an Indonesian naval base, with a reinforcement of 40 tanks and 2,000 "marines." In retaliation, hundreds of villagers were rounded up and tortured. All the houses in the hills surrounding the capital were burnt to ground.

Several major Western newspapers—Le Monde of Paris, Manchester Guardian of Great Britain, the New York Times—have published several reports, confirming the revigoration of FRETILIN forces and the increase in military clashes this year. The New York Times, in an editorial on July 25, 1980, says: "Despite claims (by Indonesia) that the territory has

United Nations and East Timor

The General Assembly

Recognizing *the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determinationand independence in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,*

Considering *that the international community is celebrating in 1980 the twentieth anniversary of the Declaration,*

Bearing in mind *that the Fifth and Sixth Conferences of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo and Havana in 1976 and 1979, respectively, reaffirmed the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence,*

Having examined *the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and other relevant documents relating to the Territory,*

Taking into consideration *the diplomatic initiative taken by the Government of Portugal with a view September 1980, in which the administering Power reaffirmed the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination,*

Taking also into consideration *the diplomatic initiative taken by the Government of Portugal with a veiw to finding a comprehensive solution to the problem of East Timor,*

Deeply concerned *at the continued suffering of the people of East Timor as a result of the hostilities still prevailing in the Territory,*

Having heard *the statements of the representatives of Portugal, as the administering Power, and Indonesia,*

Having also heard *the statements of various East Timorese petitioners and representatives of non-governmental organizations, as well as the representative of the Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente,*

In favor: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Iceland, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao P.D.R., Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Portugal, Rwanda, Saint-Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Absent: Bulgaria, Comoros, Djibouti, Dominica, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta, Mexico, Paraguay, Saint Vincent-Grenadines, Solomon Islands, South Africa been 'pacified,' FRETILIN leaders credibly assert that guerrillas have resumed their fight and have been able to strike at Dili,Timor's capital." On July 29, New York Times published a story from its correspondent, James Markham, who writes: "The Indonesian casualties which ran as high as 50 to 100 a week were reportedly ferried to Dili from the countryside by helicopter and evacuated by Hercules C-130 to Java...Most suffer from bullet and mortar wounds..."

The struggle of the people of East Timor is gaining international sympathy. Here in United States public opinion opposing U.S. military support to Indonesia is growing. We believe that United States best interests are not served by supporting Indonesia's military aggression against our country and our people. United States supported Indonesia's own struggle for independence in the forties. Today, United States should play the same constructive role by encouraging the Government of Indonesia to comply with the international community calls for an end to the war in East Timor, and for self-determination for the people of the territory.

The people of East Timor have been fighting and dying for their most sacred rights. Tens of thousands of East Timorese have died heroically so that East Timor will be free, independent, and sovereign.

Although the war in East Timor has been sustained by United States, and although tens of thousands of East Timorese have been killed by weapons supplied by the American Adminstration, we have faith in the generosity, humanity and goodness of the American people. We are confident that the East Timor solidarity movement in this country will grow stronger and stronger. And the United States will then have to reconsider its military support to a repressive regime which is alienated from its own people, a regime which, in the long run, will also alienate the United States from the Indonesian people.

ON NOVEMBER 11, 1980, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTION (35/598) ON EAST TIMOR.

1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)
2. *Declares* that the people of East Timor must be enabled freely to determine their own future within the framework of the United Nations;
3. *Welcomes* the diplomatic initiative taken by the Government of Portugal as a first step towards the free exercise by the people of East Timor of their right to self-determination and independence, and urges all parties directly concerned to co-operate fully with a view to creating the conditions necessary for the speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
4. *Expresses its deepest concern* at the continued suffering of the people of East Timor as a result of the situation still prevailing in the Territory;
5. *Requests* the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Food Programme and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to render, within their respective fields of competence, all possible assistance to the people of East Timor, particularly the children;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session on all aspects of the situation in East Timor, in particular, the political developments concerning the situations referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4 above:
7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Question of East Timor".

Voting on the resolution was as follows: For 58; Against 35; Abstentions 46.

Against: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dem. Kampuchea, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Philippines, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, New Zealand, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Uruguay, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Sates, Uruguay, Yemen

Abstaining: Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bhutan, Burma, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Romania, Samoa, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, U.K., United Republic of Cameroon, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire

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

Partners in Secret Genocide:

U.S. and Indonesia
Against the People of East Timor

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